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THE REASONABLENESS MACHINE 
BRIAN SHEPPARD* 
Abstract: Automation might someday allow for the inexpensive creation of 
highly contextualized and effective laws. If that ever comes to pass, however, it 
will not be on a blank slate. Proponents will face the question of how to comput-
erize bedrock aspects of our existing law, some of which are legal standards—
norms that use evaluative, even moral, criteria. Conventional wisdom says that 
standards are difficult to translate into computer code because they do not present 
clear operational mechanisms to follow. If that wisdom holds, one could reasona-
bly doubt that legal automation will ever get off the ground. Conventional wis-
dom, however, fails to account for the interpretive freedom that standards pro-
vide. Their murkiness makes them a fertile ground for the growth of competing 
explanations of their legal meaning. Some of those readings might be more rule-
like than others. Proponents of automation will likely be drawn to those rule-like 
interpretations, so long as they are compatible enough with existing law. This 
complex dynamic between computer-friendliness and legal interpretation makes 
it troublesome for legislators to identify the variable and fixed costs of automa-
tion. This Article aims to shed light on this relationship by focusing our attention 
on a quintessential legal standard at the center of our legal system—the Reasona-
bly Prudent Person Test. Here, I explain how automation proponents might be 
tempted by fringe, formulaic interpretations of the test, such as Averageness, be-
cause they bring comparatively low innovation costs. With time, however, tech-
nological advancement will likely drive down innovation costs, and mainstream 
interpretations, like Conventionalism, could find favor again. Regardless of the 
interpretation that proponents favor, though, an unavoidable fixed cost looms: by 
replacing the jurors who apply the test with a machine, they will eliminate a 
long-valued avenue for participatory and deliberative democracy. 
INTRODUCTION 
As technologists seek to computerize aspects of our legal apparatus, the 
notion that legal functions can be automated has transformed from object of 
imagination to corporate mission statement. Legal technology investment ex-
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ploded in 2018 to at least one billion dollars in new investments—a seven 
hundred percent increase from the prior year1—and then broke that annual in-
vestment record by the end of the third quarter of 2019.2 Several splashy in-
vestments in 2020 show that COVID-19 did little to change the trend.3 Alt-
hough investors have funded a variety of legal tech firms, a significant portion 
of this capital ended up in the hands of companies that aim to automate core 
aspects of lawyering, such as legal interpretation, legal argumentation, legal 
writing, and legal advice.4 Legal scholars, too, have begun to contemplate the 
possibility of automated “robot” judges or lawyers.5 
It is far from clear that we will ever replace core legal functions with ma-
chines, but a lack of certainty does not mean that we should refrain from study-
ing the possibility until it is clearly upon us.6 The law is the most important 
human-constructed means of regulating conduct; it claims authority over those 
who are subject to it and wields terrifying coercive power. There is something 
fundamentally risky in delegating features of our legal apparatus to machines, 
so it stands to reason that we should consider how such delegation might take 
shape, both in small and large scale, so long as automation is plausible.7 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Valentin Pivovarov, 713% Growth: Legal Tech Set an Investment Record in 2018, FORBES 
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/valentinpivovarov/2019/01/15/legaltechinvestment2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/P784-Q4JL]. 
 2 Meg McEvoy, Analysis: 2019 Legal Tech Investments Top $1B After Strong Q3, BLOOMBERG 
L. (Oct. 11, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-2019-legal-tech-
investments-top-1b-after-strong-q3/ [https://perma.cc/DCQ6-VJBV]. 
 3 See Bob Ambrogi, 20 for 2020: The Legal Tech Trends That Defined the Year, LAWSITES (Dec. 
30, 2020), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2020/12/20-for-2020-the-legal-tech-trends-that-defined-the-
year.html [https://perma.cc/W5BW-VLQG]. 
 4 Id. (showing contract automation and small claims court appeals among the top ten investments 
and discussing investments in eDiscovery and automated legal consultation). 
 5 See, e.g., Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 326 (2019); Eu-
gene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1137 (2019). 
 6 Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 UCLA L. REV. DIS-
COURSE 26, 28 (2015), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ucladis63&i=26 (“Will software 
substitute for lawyers, or increase their earning power? There will be evidence of each in coming 
decades: Routine work will continue to be automated, while new opportunities will also emerge. The 
critical question is which trend will be dominant, and what its effect will be.”).  
 7 Admittedly, if the important aspects of applying legal doctrine were to be automated, that pro-
cess would surely take place during a time in which other important dimensions of lawyer or judge 
services were automated as well. For simplicity’s sake, however, the discussion here will assume that 
the breach determination under the Reasonably Prudent Person Test (RPPT) is the only dimension of 
the process of establishing negligence in an American trial that will be handled by machines. With 
respect to other aspects of a negligence case, then, my assumption is that arguments will be raised by 
human lawyers, factual determinations will be made by human jurors, and legal determinations will be 
made by human judges. This artificiality will not undo the analysis, I hope; we can draw some confi-
dence from the fact that there are already analogous situations in the United States legal system, after 
all. For example, California recently passed a law, only to have it later repealed on referendum, that 
sought to replace its cash bail system with one in which judicial decisions regarding pre-trial detention 
turn, in part, on flight risk assessments from a “a validated risk assessment tool,” which is an algo-
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There are automation skeptics, to be sure, but they too benefit from this 
research. Even if computerization of important legal functions never comes to 
pass, features of our present-day legal system are placed in a new light when 
we carefully examine how automation might proceed. Even if only as an intui-
tion pump, carefully envisioning automated laws can reveal features of the law 
or legal system that are unavoidably human, governmental functions for which 
we overrate or underrate human performance, and underlying social values that 
need resuscitation. In short, there are benefits to taking automation seriously 
even if we don’t know when or if it will happen. 
For those who are nevertheless fixated on calculating the probability of 
legal automation, I offer a framework. The likelihood that lawyer or judge 
functions will be displaced by machines is contingent upon at least three forc-
es, which work in combination: (1) the pace and trajectory of technological 
innovation; (2) the perceived benefits of using technology in that context; and 
(3) our willingness to bend the law to accept lower performance standards.8 
Frequently, scholars focus on the first two forces, which has given rise to an 
abundance of futurist research on technology’s capacity to meet or exceed the 
performance standards as presently set by humans9 and of progressive research 
on the ways in which technology might improve access to justice in the short-
term.10 The possibility that law’s stakeholders will accept different, and more 
                                                                                                                           
rithm-powered computer program. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, § 4, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.7 
(2018), repealed by Proposition 25 (Cal. 2020); Meagan Flynn, California Abolishes Money Bail with a 
Landmark Law. But Some Reformers Think It Creates New Problems., WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/08/29/california-abolishes-money-bail-
with-a-landmark-law-but-some-reformers-think-it-creates-new-problems [https://perma.cc/4BPB-
LVSE]. So, although this analysis proceeds in the form of a thought experiment, it is not one that 
suffers from lethal defects of implausibility. 
 8 See generally Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal 
Services, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797 (focusing on the role the third force could play in displacing 
human-powered legal services). 
 9 See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz, The MIT School of Law? A Perspective on Legal Education in the 
21st Century, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1431, 1431–33; Markovic, supra note 5, at 326; Frank Pasquale, A 
Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(2019); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2d ed. 
2017).  
 10 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How Technological Change in the 
Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553, 553–54 (2014); 
James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 241, 
243–44 (2012); Sherley E. Cruz, Coding for Cultural Competency: Expanding Access to Justice with 
Technology, 86 TENN. L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2019); Jessica Frank, A2J Author, Legal Aid Organiza-
tions, and Courts: Bridging the Civil Justice Gap Using Document Assembly, 39 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 251, 251–52 (2017); Rochelle Klempner, The Case for Court-Based Document Assembly Pro-
grams: A Review of the New York State Court System’s “DIY” Forms, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1189, 
1192– 93 (2014); J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology, 
70 VAND. L. REV. 1993, 1994–2001 (2017); Kathleen Elliott Vinson & Samantha A. Moppett, Digital 
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technologically feasible, performance of legal functions has gotten less atten-
tion,11 but it has the capacity to play a pivotal role in the process of automa-
tion. Increased willingness to change our law’s substance and procedure to 
make automation easier decreases the wait time for adequate technological 
performance. This, in turn, lowers innovation costs12 and makes it more likely 
that the technology will be perceived to provide a net benefit.13 
Central features of existing legal systems are difficult to change, both be-
cause citizens likely perceive them to be of great benefit14 and because wide-
scale revisions present challenging logistical or coordination problems.15 In-
deed, this may well be why extensive automation of law never comes to pass. 
                                                                                                                           
Pro Bono: Leveraging Technology to Provide Access to Justice, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 551, 551–53 
(2018). 
 11 See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 8, at 1876–96 (considering ways in which ease of automation 
could change practice of law and legal interpretation). Scholars who have considered changing laws to 
hasten automation have typically focused upon the ways in which legal ethics rules might be modified 
to allow legal technology to gain ground in the legal services market. See, e.g., Agnieszka McPeak, 
Disruptive Technology and the Ethical Lawyer, 50 U. TOL. L. REV. 457, 474–75 (2019) (“While some 
of these barriers are justified by these other purposes of the ABA Model Rules, some rules can be seen 
as anti-competitive and slow to evolve to the realities of modern legal needs. . . . While lawyers must 
honor and uphold the law, they can also take on leadership roles in law reform. Although law reform 
activities should not conflict with duties to clients, it is certainly within the lawyer’s role to move the 
law forward to allow for new innovation—especially lawtech.”). 
 12 I use “cost” to refer not only to the price of goods or services, but also to development time. 
Economic Cost, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2011) (“[T]he cost in money, time, 
and other resources needed in order to do something or make something”). I also consider error or risk 
of error to be a cost, particularly in the context of reliability. 
 13 A simple, albeit implausible, illustration might be helpful: suppose that we were willing to 
accept that all legal disputes be resolved by the spin of a wheel of fortune. We presently have the 
technology to create and install a sufficient number of automated wheels to handle the volume of 
disputes at low cost. Moreover, this cost would be much smaller than the cost associated with support-
ing human judges, law clerks, lawyers, expert witnesses, and the like. Under those conditions, the 
perceived benefit of implementing the technology would be quite high, and it would therefore be 
reasonable to predict that automation of dispute resolution would occur in short order. Thankfully, 
such a departure from the dictates and inherent values of our legal system is scarcely imaginable, but 
it shows the impact that willingness to bend the law could have on the value proposition of automa-
tion. 
 14 See, e.g., The Public, the Political System and American Democracy, PEW RSCH. CTR. 40, 46 
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/04/4-26-2018-
Democracy-release-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9R8-35YS] (finding that members of both political par-
ties agree on several critical election issues, even in a polarized political climate). “Republicans and 
Democrats widely agree on the most important electoral components for the U.S. Nearly nine-in-ten 
across both parties say it is very important that elections are free from tampering . . . . Comparable 
majorities in both parties also say it’s very important that no eligible voters are prevented from voting 
(85% of Republicans, 83% of Democrats),” and “[a] large majority of Americans say it’s important 
for there to be a balance of power between the three branches of the federal government.” Id. (empha-
sis omitted). 
 15 See, e.g., David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 
753–54 (2009) (“In order for the people to maintain control over the government, they must not only 
find a way to monitor the government, but also overcome large-scale coordination problems.”). 
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It is far easier, however, to repeal or add individual laws and perhaps easier 
still to change the dominant interpretation of an existing legal test. If we as-
sume for the sake of analysis that there is a desire to automate, the malleability 
of law can be exploited to hasten automation by changing legal tests to make 
them easier to translate into computer code. 
A single article does not permit us to analyze the automation potential of 
more than a small number of legal functions. Some selectivity is required to 
illustrate the push and pull of the three forces. The best choice is a legal func-
tion that is commonplace (which increases the likelihood that automation 
would be seen as a favorable way to cut expenses); that is potentially difficult 
to computerize under existing technology (which carves out a role for the pace 
and trajectory of innovation); and that has given rise to several competing in-
terpretations (which illuminates the complex relationship between law’s malle-
ability and lowering costs of innovation). 
The test for negligent breach in American tort law, popularly known as 
the Reasonably Prudent Person Test (RPPT), meets all of these conditions.16 It 
is ubiquitous, potentially tricky to translate into computer code, and has given 
rise to divergent interpretations, some of which are easier to computerize. 
To be sure, focusing on the RPPT means that I will not be able to spend as 
much time on other aspects of negligence law that could be subject to automa-
tion. That is to say: if courts or other stakeholders automated the test for 
breach, it is likely that other aspects of negligence cases would be automated 
as well, such as fact-finding or damages calculation.17 I will not be considering 
these non-breach dimensions in detail, however. Doing otherwise in an article 
of this size would risk spreading the analysis too thinly, and the importance of 
the RPPT cannot be overstated. 
The RPPT is the beating heart of negligence liability, serving as the crite-
rion for satisfaction of breach in the many cases involving ordinary duties.18 
Breach is an element of the prima facie case for negligence,19 and it is typically 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See, e.g., Cornella v. Churchill Cnty., 377 P.3d 97, 102 (Nev. 2016) (identifying the test for 
ordinary negligence as the Reasonably Prudent Person Test); Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019). 
 17 Likewise, I will not have space to discuss in detail important administrative considerations like 
the manner in which funding would occur, data would be accessed and secured, or builders would be 
selected. 
 18 See, e.g., Christopher Brett Jaeger et al., Justice Is (Change) Blind: Applying Research on Vis-
ual Metacognition in Legal Settings, 23 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 263 (2017) (“Defendants in tort 
cases are, in theory, liable for negligence only if they breach a duty of care owed to the plaintiff. And, 
speaking generally, a defendant breaches his or her duty of care only if he or she fails to act as an 
ordinary, reasonably prudent person would have acted in the circumstances.”). 
 19 See Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 111, 
118–21 (discussing negligence and assigning a “‘reasonable algorithm’ standard” to non-human deci-
sion-makers). 
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a jury’s duty to resolve whether a breach has occurred. Ordinary duty cases 
make up a large share of all negligence cases, which give rise to hundreds of 
billions of dollars in costs annually.20 
The RPPT is also a fruitful object of study for legal theorists. It is the par-
adigmatic legal standard21—it is what we think of when we think of a ubiqui-
tous but paltry legal constraint. Although legal interpretation and the pro-
cessing of computer code are not the same enterprise, the oft-discussed 
rules/standards distinction in legal theory is a good rule-of-thumb for identify-
ing the challenges to automation of interpretative tasks in law.22 A bright-line 
rule, such as the tax provision that imposes upon married, joint filing individu-
als a ten percent tax rate for taxable income up to $19,050,23 is far easier to 
computerize than a standard, such as the statute that requires removal of a legal 
permanent resident for a crime of moral turpitude.24 Given the predominance 
of rules in the U.S. Tax Code,25 it is hardly surprising that tax preparation 
software has a track record of success; estimates suggest that more than thirty-
four and a half million taxpayers used it in preparing their tax returns in 
2019.26 
Like many standards, the RPPT is meager and murky on its face: it simp-
ly asks the jury to decide whether a party or parties acted as a reasonable per-
son would act.27 The test’s reliance upon short, evaluative content (“reasonably 
                                                                                                                           
 20 According to one study, albeit one from a tort reform advocate, “[l]iability related to automo-
bile accident claims accounted for $160 billion” in 2016. Costs and Compensation of the U.S. Tort 
System, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 4 (Oct. 2018), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/
wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Tort_costs_paper_FINAL_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU49-J442]. 
 21 E.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Book Reviews and Notes, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 389, 393 (1997) (review-
ing ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS: 
ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996)) (“The reasonableness principle is a paradigmatic 
standard.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1687–1713 (1976) (tying the rules/standards distinction to rhetorical modes of individual-
ism and altruism in private law judicial decision-making); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 
1991 Term–Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56–122 (1992) 
(utilizing the rules/standards distinction for assessing Supreme Court opinions).  
 23 26 U.S.C. § 1(j)(2)(A). 
 24 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 25 But cf. Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards: In-
terpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 53, 54–57 (2015), https://heinonline.
org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/duljo64&i=52 (arguing that rule of law values permit stakeholders to treat 
tax code provisions as standards). 
 26 Paul Kiel & Justin Elliott, TurboTax and Others Charged at Least 14 Million Americans for 
Tax Prep That Should Have Been Free, Audit Finds, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.
propublica.org/article/turbotax-and-others-charged-at-least-14-million-americans-for-tax-prep-that-
should-have-been-free-audit-finds [https://perma.cc/Q6M2-7EZQ]. 
 27 See Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: En-
compassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 930 (2001) (“First, the 
‘reasonable person’ test is obscure. Although it does tell us that the subjective views of the actor are 
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prudent”) appears to direct jurors to engage in a loosely guided normative 
evaluation of the facts before them. This could very well call for them to make 
complex, context-based assessments. Linguistically, the RPPT is the hot fudge 
sundae of indeterminacy: it is semantically vague because it is likely to pro-
duce a lot of borderline cases, it is general because a variety of conduct falls 
under its umbrella, and it is multidimensionally polysemic because it is unclear 
which features of decision-making that underlie reasonableness must be pre-
sent for the test to be satisfied and in what amount.28 
Therefore, it is not obvious that the RPPT can be satisfactorily29 encoded 
into machine language. If interpretation of the RPPT can be automated, then 
perhaps anything in law can be. 
But the notion that rules are easy to encode and standards are difficult is 
simply a rule of thumb. Rules can close off avenues for automation, and stand-
ards can provide opportunities. An existing legal rule might set forth condi-
tions for satisfaction that are difficult to detect using machines due to their 
complexity or obscurity.30 Replacing these machine-unfriendly rules is poten-
tially costly because of the risk that people will view the change as a repeal or 
amendment to existing law.31 Perversely, the standard-like quality of a legal 
norm could serve as an opportunity to automate under the right circumstances. 
The openness of a standard might give rise to a range of permissible legal in-
terpretations, some of which are compatible to translation into machine code. 
If so, the perceived benefits of automation might lead to a new consensus 
around the computerizable interpretation but without the same risk that people 
will view adoption of that interpretation as a repeal or amendment. In other 
words, the openness of a standard is a double-edged sword; it can make trans-
lation of its meaning into computer code difficult, but it can also make it easier 
to offer attractive, translation-friendly conceptions of that meaning. 
The RPPT has this character. Its openness appears, at first, to be incom-
patible with machine coding. But the frequency with which the RPPT has been 
applied has given rise to a number of alternative, legally plausible interpreta-
                                                                                                                           
not decisive of fault, it does not explain which factors are relevant to fault.” (emphasis omitted) (foot-
note omitted)). 
 28 Brian G. Slocum, Replacing the Flawed Chevron Standard, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 
214–17 (2018) (describing linguistic indeterminacy of words such as “intelligent” and “reasonable”). 
 29 By saying “satisfactorily,” I hope to signal that my analysis here does not set the bar at perfec-
tion. Perfect mimicry of human interpretation or perfect performance of ideal interpretation might be 
an interesting subject to ponder, but it is not a precondition for automation. Imperfect and even inferi-
or machine work can displace human work if it has a lower price/performance ratio. 
 30 For example, a rule that conditions fishing of a certain species based on the population of that 
species in particular waters might suffer from such difficulties. 
 31 See, e.g., Frank Cross et al., A Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1, 39 (discussing the difficulty in changing rules); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, 
Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1147, 1163 (2011) (same). 
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tions of the test. This intrinsic malleability could facilitate computerization by 
allowing the selection of the most computerizable, yet legally plausible, alter-
native. 
Thus, the frequency, importance, and challenge of the RPPT make it the 
perfect focal point for an analysis of the automation of legal interpretation. 
This undertaking will require identification and consideration of competing 
interpretations of the standard, as well as assessment of how the project of au-
tomation might falter in practice. In this Article, I undertake this project. 
Although my focus is on the future, I am not seeking to predict it. As le-
gal technologist and scholar Daniel Martin Katz warns, “Despite all technical 
possibilities, prediction is a difficult enterprise, and as such, one should con-
front the question with humility.”32 I seek only to increase our understanding 
of the complex relationship between legal constraint, machine interpretation, 
and cost. It is true that a significant portion of my analysis will discuss how 
some interpretations of the RPPT are easier to computerize than others. At 
those points, I will periodically reference the extensive literature aiming to 
predict whether machines will reach important milestones such as conscious-
ness or feeling. Those references are not endorsements, and I do not wish to 
make such heady prognostications here. Rather than hypothesizing when or if 
we will arrive at a destination, I take on the humbler task of describing which 
routes appear shorter or longer on a map that doesn’t show the traffic. 
In Part I, I discuss the development of interpretive technology, focusing 
on the development of Natural Language Processing (NLP) and identifying its 
strengths and weaknesses with respect to rules and standards under typical 
conditions of application.33 In so doing, I identify the parameters by which we 
can judge the difficulty of computerization. In Part II, I introduce the RPPT, 
identifying the major competing conceptions of its meaning and then subject-
ing them to the parameters of computerization.34 After taking stock of those 
results, I step outside of the legal meaning of the RPPT in Part III to reveal 
potentially vital structural aspects of our legal system as a whole that could be 
lost if computerization of RPPT is adopted.35 
I. RULES, STANDARDS, AND THEIR AUTOMATION 
It is fair to wonder whether legislators will have any interest in automat-
ing legal interpretation and, if so, whether there are any factors they will con-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 958 
(2013). 
 33 See discussion infra Part I. 
 34 See discussion infra Part II. 
 35 See discussion infra Part III. 
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sider in that endeavor. In this political environment, it is hard to imagine Amer-
ican legislators doing anything of this scale and ambition. If our forecasting 
window is large enough, however, it becomes fair to predict that the political 
winds will shift enough that grand legislative initiatives will have a chance of 
passage. If that much is true, then the economic appeal of an initiative will be a 
good predictor of the likelihood of a particular initiative’s passage. The 
rules/standards distinction has proven to be a useful prism through which to 
evaluate resource management in legislation.36 I will start there. 
A. The Cost Centers of Rules and Standards 
Rules set forth specific, concrete directives, and it is commonplace that a 
rule will condition compliance on numerical minimums or maximums.37 
Standards, by contrast, set forth evaluative, discretionary directives.38 Rules 
are assumed to be better at constraining those subject to them and therefore are 
more likely to bring about desired conduct.39 There is some empirical support 
for this proposition.40 Thus, rules can have a big payoff for those with the au-
thority to create them.41 
A significant problem for legislators is that the constraining force of rules 
brings the risk that an unwise or poorly written rule could lead to undesired 
outcomes by channeling conduct in a fruitless or counterproductive direction.42 
This is particularly problematic if correcting the rule would be difficult, which 
is often the case.43 Thus, legislative repeal or amendment is costly from both a 
resource and a political standpoint because it renews the process of engaging 
in potentially burdensome or expensive rule creation44 and because it consti-
tutes an admission of error, respectively.45 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See, e.g., Prasad Krishnamurthy, Rules, Standards, and Complexity in Capital Regulation, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S273, S275 (2014) (noting the utility of distinction). 
 37 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 961–62 (1995). 
 38 See id. at 964–65. 
 39 See Brian Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the Relationship 
Between Legal Decisionmaking and Time, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 931, 990 (2012) [hereinafter Shep-
pard, Judging Under Pressure]. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621–22 
(1992). 
 42 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961, 2002 (2007). 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See Daniel W. Drezner, Why Can’t World Leaders Ever Admit They Were Wrong?, WASH. POST 
(June 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/09/why-cant-world-
leaders-ever-admit-they-were-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/3CV7-ANBA] (describing how political in-
centives make it costly for political leaders to admit error, stating “[doing so] generates zero political 
upside and risks alienating one’s base”). 
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To minimize the risk of undesired outcomes, legislators must take great 
care in crafting rules, which often will include understanding, in detail, the 
state of affairs that they want and the constraints upon conduct that are neces-
sary to bring it about. 46 Ordinarily, the domain in which legislators operate is 
dynamic, multifaceted, or otherwise complex, which makes it harder for them to 
know how to fashion a rule that appropriately responds to the domain’s com-
plexity.47 Providing a directive that gives subjects the path to follow in every 
important context is hard and, therefore, costly.48 In other words, rules are 
powerful instruments of change, for better or worse. Therefore, discerning the 
optimal course of conduct and thereafter creating a rule to bring it about are 
costly endeavors for the rule-maker who is keen to avoid serious error.49 
Learning the ways in which rule drafting is expensive will help us identi-
fy the cost centers of legislation and, thereafter, to make better predictions re-
garding the desirability of automation. My account is largely minimalist, fo-
cusing on the work of creating norms to effectuate a state of affairs.50 
The lodestar of legislative design should be the state of affairs that the 
legislator seeks to bring about.51 With that aim, the primary task is to devise a 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 176 (2015) 
(“Rules require precision. In enacting rules, the legislature must accurately identify the circumstances 
under which the chosen rule will achieve the desired results. . . . To succeed in this task, the legislature 
must gather, analyze, and categorize an enormous amount of information—a process requiring the 
expenditure of substantial resources.”). 
 47 John C. Roberts, Gridlock and Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2190–91 (2013) 
(“[L]egislating is difficult under the best of circumstances . . . .”). 
 48 See id. 
 49 Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. 
REV. 1303, 1307–08, 1313 (2015) (“One involves the distinction between rules and standards . . . . [A 
distinction that] govern[s] the intensity of effort (and thus cost) of supplying legal content both ex ante 
and ex post. Moreover, they influence the law’s consequences for individuals’ behavior in the interim 
because such behavior depends critically on the extent to which individuals choose to become in-
formed about the law before they act. . . . Rules are more expensive up front because more effort is 
expended then, and standards are more costly in adjudication because substantive legal content must 
be determined at that time.”). 
 50 I do not deny that there are other aspects of legislation that are important and potentially costly. 
Other academics have provided fulsome accounts, particularly in the field of legisprudence – which 
sets forth rational principles of legislation, such as justifying limits to freedom posed by the legislation 
under consideration. See Luc J. Wintgens, Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation, 19 RATIO 
JURIS 1, 10–24 (2006). 
 51 It is certainly possible that a legislator has not identified a desired state of affairs or is at a loss 
to describe its features. They might seek only to appear as though they are engaged in an important 
legislative project while actually seeking to maintain the status quo; they might score political points 
without changing the current state of affairs. This is not so implausible. Cf. Tony Wright, What Is It 
About Politicians?, 84 POL. Q. 448, 448–53 (2013) (discussing the accuracy of the popular belief that 
politicians primarily engage in games rather than drafting good legislation for their constituents). In 
such a situation, they could do any number of things, but it is not obvious that a rule or standard 
would be the better approach. For instance, a bad faith legislator might create rules of exceedingly 
narrow scope so as to render them inert or create vague standards that are unlikely to bring about 
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function that draws a connection between certain conduct and the desired state 
of affairs. This is like asking, “What kind of behavior would bring about the 
state of affairs we want?” Once identified, the work of drafting the legal norm 
is largely a matter of devising a test that makes legal compliance contingent 
upon the desired conduct and an appropriate penalty for non-compliance. It 
sounds simple, but it can take hard work.52 First, it might be challenging to 
identify the various forms of conduct that should be altered by the norm. Even 
with knowledge of the scope of conduct to be regulated, it might be difficult to 
determine a sufficiently effective way to alter that conduct. And even then, it 
might be difficult to articulate the conduct alteration function in the form of a 
norm that can be followed reliably by people who are subject to it and by offi-
cials who make determinations of compliance. 
Suppose a legislator wants to minimize sidewalk injuries. The desired 
state of affairs covers a wide range of conduct; sidewalks can be busy places, 
hosting myriad activities and, therefore, myriad mishaps. Even if the legislator 
simplified the problem by limiting the state of affairs to, say, no slipping and 
falling from unshoveled snow, it might be difficult to derive a satisfactory 
norm to guide conduct. The legislator might begin with the norm, “All opera-
tors of land that abuts public sidewalks must have those sidewalks clear of 
snow after a snowfall or face a four hundred dollar fine.” 
Although this law provides somewhat specific guidance, it is arguably 
both too onerous and too lenient. On the one hand, it would seem to put too 
much of a burden on operators who experience a snowfall that ends at two 
o’clock in the morning. On the other hand, it might excuse people who live on 
highly traveled streets and let pedestrians eliminate the snow with their feet, 
thereby risking the very people the law was supposed to protect. It also suffers 
from semantic vagueness. What does it mean to be “clear of snow”? Does that 
include the thin layers of ice that remain after shoveling? The dusted snow that 
blows upon the sidewalk from post-storm winds? Further, it might not be ob-
vious when snowfall has ended. What about intermittent waves of snow spaced 
out by a few hours? 
A legislator seeking to provide adequate, up-front guidance will probably 
have to predict issues of that sort and revise the norm in a way that resolves 
them.53 Doing so will likely require the accumulation of considerable back-
ground knowledge. The legislator should be aware of the variety and nature of 
conduct that affects the risk of snow-related falls. In this example, legislators 
should have some understanding of the relevant resources of the snow clearers, 
                                                                                                                           
change to existing law. That is not the focal point here; rather, I assume that the legislator is acting in 
earnest to bring about a known, desired state of affairs. 
 52 Kaplow, supra note 41, at 568–69, 579–80. 
 53 See id. 
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the character of winter storm systems, and the ways in which snow interacts 
with sidewalks both with and without removal efforts. 
With that knowledge, the legislator should then consider the ways in 
which setting the norm’s conditions will alter the behavior of those subject to 
the norm. Doing this part well requires knowledge of the direction in which 
behavior ought to be channeled as well as the severity of sanctions needed to 
motivate compliant conduct.54 Here, the legislator should probably consider 
whether operators will need guidance as to the tools or chemicals that should 
be used, as well as whether the fine for non-compliance outstrips the costs of 
purchasing those resources in light of the frequency of snow. 
This endeavor also forces the legislator to consider the reliability55 of the 
norm under consideration. The good legislator will develop the capacity to 
draft a norm that will be comprehensible enough that those subject to it will 
change their conduct in a way that makes the desired state of affairs more like-
ly to occur.56 To succeed, the drafter might need to consider the reading levels 
of landowners or snow clearers and whether the test for compliance is precise 
enough. A judge or juror must also be able to understand the norm and have 
the capacity to apply it correctly and neutrally. This brings the additional con-
cern of whether the adjudicator can adequately determine what the operative 
facts are. 
Finally, the legislator should consider whether the norm would conflict 
with other existing laws.57 If laws push subjects at cross-purposes, the norm 
might threaten the capacity of other laws to realize their ends. In this example, 
there might be noise ordinances that could place snow-removers in a catch-22, 
leading them not to clear snow at certain hours of the day. 
Thus, a legislator’s intent to provide clear guidance faces at least three ar-
eas that demand effort or otherwise impose costs: (1) knowledge regarding 
existing conduct and its surrounding conditions (“background knowledge”); 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical 
Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2188 (2010) (“Sanction setting itself requires a difficult balancing 
of under- and overdeterrence costs.”). 
 55 By reliability, I mean the likelihood that the norm, itself, leads to error. By error, I mean the 
norm brings about an unsatisfactory state of affairs from the perspective of those who legislated the 
norm. An error of this sort might occur because the norm sets an ineffective or inaccurate test for 
compliance. 
 56 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63–65 (2d ed. 1969) (explaining laws must be 
comprehensible so that citizens should be able to identify what the laws prohibit, permit, or require). 
 57 See Karen M. Gebbia, The Keepers of the Code: Evolution of the Bankruptcy Community, 91 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 183, 198–99 (2017) (“Several factors contribute to clarity and coherence concerns in 
aging statutory law. These include a patchwork of conflicting judicial decisions, interim amendments 
that might be poorly drafted or might not integrate cleanly with existing law, and increasingly detailed 
and ossified statutory provisions that may reduce the law’s flexibility to adjust to new and unantici-
pated circumstances.”). 
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(2) creation of an instrument for conduct alteration that reliably leads to the 
desired state of affairs (“reliability”); and (3) understanding of potential con-
flict with existing law (“compatibility”). 
This is where the legislative value of standards becomes apparent. 
Imagine that our snow-hating legislature decides that it would be too 
much work to fix their draft rule and so they scrap it for the standard, “All op-
erators of land that abuts public sidewalks must keep their sidewalks in rea-
sonable condition or face a four hundred dollar fine.” 
Their lack of background knowledge ceases to be a weighty cost to the 
legislator because the standard is designed to allow factual scenarios to play 
out before clear guidance is given. In this regard, it delegates to adjudicators 
the work of understanding the characteristics and variety of the conduct that is 
to be regulated by the norm.58 Typically, this work falls to law-applying organs 
like judges who get those cases before them.59 
A standard can also lower the cost to craft a reliable function for determin-
ing compliance.60 Devising a standard like our, “Keep . . . sidewalks in reasona-
ble condition” takes only a modicum of effort. As with scope, the hard work of 
reliably connecting conditions to their desired states of affairs is pushed down-
stream and broken up. The law-applying organs will likely serve as piecemeal 
legislators, announcing whether the facts before them comply with the stand-
ard and potentially creating a small rule in the process.61 This is a less daunting 
assignment than the one that could have faced the initial legislator; judges or 
jurors are charged with determining compliance only for the case before them 
(and, in systems of precedent, those future cases that bear a sufficiently strong 
resemblance to it). Yes, these downstream legislators must learn more about 
the context in which they apply the rule, but at least they do not need to face 
every plausible context in which they might apply it. Ideally, this process of 
identifying the particular way to apply the principle in the standard (effectively 
converting it to a rule) in a particular case can be repeated, gradually providing 
an evolved and reliable norm—one that likely falls somewhere between a rule 
and a standard.62 Even when judges have the impulse and opportunity to an-
nounce a more rule-like interpretation of a standard, they might do so with ac-
cess to information regarding how human beings have interpreted and, thereaf-
                                                                                                                           
 58 See Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1287, 1298 (2006) (“The use of standards can be criticized as involving inherent delegation of law-
making authority to the decision maker employing the standard—that is, mostly judges, particularly 
trial judges.”). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Kaplow, supra note 49, at 1307–09. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 803, 805–06 (2005). 
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ter, behaved under the existing legal standard (and its revisions). In theory, this 
will improve the reliability of their revision. 
Finally, a standard lowers the costs of determining legal compatibility. 
Because the rule will gradually develop under the steady watch of the courts 
and is subject to the arguments of adversarial litigants, it is less likely that a 
standard will pose problems of compatibility. Although it is true that a legal 
standard is more likely to run afoul of the vagueness doctrine, that seldomly 
successful constitutional principle is unlikely to be a weighty concern, particu-
larly in areas that do not involve criminal punishment or speech regulation.63 
Even those concerns are likely to dissipate over time as the standard becomes 
rulified.64 
There are at least two important downsides, however. First, the legislator 
risks that the standard will be an unreliable conduct modifier, at least in its ear-
ly stages. Cases might trickle into the courts, leaving ordinary folks largely 
rudderless in their attempt to interpret the standard when deciding how to act. 
Secondly, the legislator has relinquished a great deal of control over the even-
tual content of the norm to people who could have different ideologies or mo-
tivations. Consequently, they might end up dismayed with the manner in which 
the evolving norm regulates conduct or, worse, with the state of affairs that the 
evolving rule brings about—and it might take a long time to figure this out. 
Although this brief hypothetical exercise might seem too abstract to be of 
much use, it has yielded two practical principles. First, rules and standards 
provide different but bilateral costs and benefits. Second, legislative costs can 
be divided into three meaningful categories: background knowledge, reliabil-
ity, and compatibility. 
B. Natural Language Processing of Rules and Standards 
It is not controversial to claim that applying facts to the law is, at least in 
part, an interpretive exercise.65 A lesser-known truth is that machine processing 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Guyora Binder & Brenner Fissell, A Political Interpretation of Vagueness Doctrine, 2019 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1527, 1538 (discussing frequency in criminal and speech contexts); Michael S. Kelley, 
“Something Beyond”: The Unconstitutional Vagueness of RICO’s Pattern Requirement, 40 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 331, 371 (1991) (explaining why invalidation under the vagueness doctrine is so rare). 
 64 See, e.g., Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting vagueness 
challenge); Villeneuve v. Connecticut, No. 10CV296, 2010 WL 4976001, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 
2010) (rejecting vagueness challenge because, “Although the plain text of the rules may lack precision 
and detail, it is clear from the rules, Official Comment, and case law interpreting substantively identi-
cal rules that the rules are limited to conduct that is relevant to and based on the practice of law, and 
therefore lawyers are sufficiently on notice of what the rules proscribe”). 
 65 See generally, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) 
(characterizing adjudication as an interpretive act). In saying this, I do not mean that it is only inter-
pretive or that it is therefore subject to the same interpretive techniques that are used for literature. Cf. 
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is interpretive too. Computer code is a language consisting of rules that the 
machine is capable of interpreting and following.66 Machines do not do this 
consciously (at least that is what we generally assume), but that does not pre-
vent their performance of this function from providing considerable value to 
humans. The challenge of automating legal interpretation is essentially the 
challenge of mapping computer code to legal language. Legal language is nat-
ural language; it has evolved from human interaction.67 Computer code is not 
natural language; scientists designed it according to a rigid, purpose-driven 
syntax.68 Therefore, machine interpretation of natural language has the addi-
tional hurdle of translation. 
Some scholars have suggested that law is a less challenging domain for 
translation because it is already code-like.69 It is true that law uses norms to 
designate certain conduct as legally compliant or non-compliant, and that 
work, on a grand scale, could ideally create an organized network of direc-
tives.70 Compared to ordinary talk, legal texts are orderly and contain a higher 
proportion of clear meanings and resolution protocols.71 
Looking closer at a legal system, however, reveals that laws exist on a 
continuum with respect to their achievement of this ideal. Bright-line rules 
come closest,72 so we can hypothesize that they will be the easiest to translate 
                                                                                                                           
Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-as-Literature 
Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 205 (1987) (claiming that adjudication is an act of creation of law 
backed by force rather than an act of interpretation). 
 66 RAMESH BANGIA, IT TOOLS AND APPLICATIONS 63 (2d ed. 2005). 
 67 PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 
199 (2018) (“Not all laws can be easily translated into code. Legal rules are written in natural lan-
guage, which is, by its very nature, inherently flexible and ambiguous.”). 
 68 ROLAND HAUSSER, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS: HUMAN-COMPUTER 
COMMUNICATION IN NATURAL LANGUAGE 4 (3d ed. 2014). 
 69 See, e.g., Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 
24 (2011) (“Given that most laws can be formulated into if-then statements, and that much of legal 
decision-making is characterized, at a high level, in terms of deductive structure, we can begin to see 
the natural appeal between computerized automated reasoning systems—which take complicated ‘if-
then’ rules and analyze them applying deductive logic—and the law.”). 
 70 See Henry Prakken & Giovanni Sartor, Law and Logic: A Review from an Argumentation Per-
spective, 227 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 214, 217–22 (2015) (“So far everything [regarding the use of 
logic-based artificial intelligence (AI)] has been compatible with viewing the law as an axiomatic 
system, where rules and facts are represented in a logical language and deductive logic is used to 
derive legal consequences from the representations. At first sight, it might be thought that the axio-
matic approach to the law is committed to deductive logic. However, this approach has been broad-
ened to include nonmonotonic techniques to deal with two very common structural features of legal 
regulations, the separation of general rules and exceptions, and the use of hierarchies over legislative 
sources to resolve conflicts between different regulations within a normative system.”). 
 71 See id. 
 72 See, e.g., Eric Engle, Legal Interpretation by Computer: A Survey of Interpretive Rules, 5 AK-
RON INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 92 (2011) (“Formalist rules are easiest to model computationally, because 
the results are most predictable; the lament of ‘mechanical jurisprudence.’”). 
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into computer code. A series of if-then commands might even do the trick.73 
Take a speed limit, for example. If the number entered for traveled speed is 
higher than the number entered for the speed limit, then the punishment func-
tion is turned on.74 Of course, not all legal tests, even those that are rule-like, 
correspond to a clear numerical trigger. For example, the statutory rule that 
copyright protection be granted to works “fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression” does not have that feature.75 And for a machine to be able to handle a 
variety of legal tests over a long period of time, the machine would need to be 
programmed with a robust capacity to interpret natural language in a variety of 
cases, including those that are less rule-like. Enter artificial intelligence. 
The research field in which AI is used to interpret natural language is 
called Natural Language Processing (NLP). NLP scientists, drawing from lin-
guistics and philosophy, find it useful to break natural language into three 
components: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.76 Linguists and computer 
scientists often define syntax as the formal relations of signs to one another or, 
more broadly, to be the formal aspects of a language.77 They understand se-
mantics to be the relations between expressions or, more specifically, to be that 
to which a sign refers. Finally, they understand pragmatics to be the relations 
among expressions, their meanings, and the use that speakers make of these 
expressions in contexts of utterance.78 These components are in ascending or-
der of complexity, and this complexity correlates with resistance to computer 
codification.79 Unsurprisingly, it also correlates with the amount of time we 
will have to wait for machine performance to meet human performance thresh-
olds. Experts estimate that significant reduction of the gap between human and 
machine progress on semantics will occur over the next three decades, with 
significant progress occurring on pragmatics in the three decades after that.80 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Surden, supra note 69, at 24. 
 74 Interestingly, it is not obvious that even the translation of speed limit enforcement to computer 
code would not require the use of discretion when it comes to letter-of-the-law or spirit-of-the-law 
choices. An experimental study in which fifty-two programmers were asked to take on this task result-
ed in the finding that “[u]nfortunately, laws were not created with automated enforcement in mind, 
and even seemingly simple laws have subtle features that require programmers to make assumptions 
about how to encode them.” Lisa Shay et al., Abstract: Do Robots Dream of Electric Laws? An Exper-
iment in the Law as Algorithm, Presentation at the We Robot Conference 2013 (Apr. 8–9, 2013), 
http://www.gregconti.com/publications/201303_AlgoLaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5CW-UETC]. 
 75 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 76 See, e.g., MAURIZIO GABBRIELLI & SIMONE MARTINI, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: PRINCI-
PLES AND PARADIGMS 27–28 (2010); Erik Cambria & Bebo White, Jumping NLP Curves: A Review 
of Natural Language Processing Research, 9 IEEE COMPUTATIONAL INTEL. MAG. 48, 48–49 (2014).  
 77 Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation, supra note 8, at 1851. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Cambria & White, supra note 76, at 48. 
 80 Id. at 51 fig.1. 
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Today, the AI powering NLP is primarily syntactical: it identifies correla-
tions between natural language queries and natural language answers by rely-
ing on the sequence of characters or audio waveforms for each.81 The most 
well-known systems that use this approach are Amazon’s Alexa or Apple’s 
Siri, which rely on a treasure trove of links between internet search field inputs 
and ranked search results that have been approved through the conduct of mil-
lions upon millions of users.82 When these programs identify a strong enough 
correlation between an input and the desired user response—in the context of 
search, the desired response is often a user accessing a particular search result 
or a portion thereof—then the program can use that information to produce a 
sound that resembles a spoken answer to a question.83 That answer is effective-
ly a vocalization of the top search result.84 Artificial intelligence of this sort 
might not be smart, but it is useful. It is clear that syntactical processing and 
rudimentary semantics can produce impressive results when sufficient high-
quality data is analyzed. 
Semantically powered NLP systems are not as ubiquitous as syntactically 
powered systems, but they are becoming more commonplace. Presently, there 
are numerous products and research initiatives that use AI to construct seman-
tic webs of concepts known as ontologies.85 These webs aim to allow machines 
to distinguish between identical sequences of characters or sounds based on 
linkages to categories of meaning. A semantically powered machine might be 
able to identify the themes in a brand-new poem even if those themes are ab-
stracted and challenging to identify on a straightforward reading.86 
As for pragmatics, the industry is at a relatively rudimentary state of de-
velopment, lagging far behind human ability.87 Humans are equipped with a 
massive store of structured background knowledge that enables us to identify 
how contextual factors can change the meaning of a statement. Computers are 
not. If I walk into a McDonald’s and ask a friend, “What should I do?,” the 
friend can readily understand that I mean, “What should I order?” And if that 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. at 51. 
 82 Josh Hendrickson, Alexa, Siri, and Google Don’t Understand a Word You Say, HOW-TO GEEK 
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.howtogeek.com/405011/voice-assistants-dont-really-understand-you/ 
[https://perma.cc/MG89-P7W4]. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See Maryam Ramezani et al., Using Machine Learning to Support Continuous Ontology De-
velopment, in KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT BY THE MASSES 381, 381–90 (Philipp 
Cimiano & H. Sofia Pinto eds., 2010).  
 86 See Geetanjali Rakshit et al., Automated Analysis of Bangla Poetry for Classification and Poet 
Identification, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NATURAL LAN-
GUAGE PROCESSING 247, 247 (Dipti Misra Sharma et al. eds., 2015).  
 87 JASON WHITTAKER, TECH GIANTS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF JOUR-
NALISM 119 (2019). 
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friend also knows that I am trying to lose weight, they might understand my 
question as, “What’s the best combination of flavor and healthiness on the 
menu?” For humans, this is no great feat, but for a machine it is.88 
It turns out that the rules/standard distinction is useful for approximating 
the challenge that an individual norm would pose for NLP in its current state. 
Rules can limit the role that pragmatics and, to a lesser extent, semantics, play 
in interpretation. 
Rules streamline decision-making and cabin discretion by limiting the 
number of considerations necessary to reach the correct89 interpretation; they 
also provide relatively clear guidance regarding the analysis of those consider-
ations. Thus, they are, comparatively speaking, self-contained. Interpretation 
of legal norms does not demand that we rely solely upon syntactics when in-
terpreting legal rules, but individual canons of construction can come close. 
For instance, the popular “plain meaning rule” warns against unnecessary re-
sort to pragmatics-laden factors such as public policy or morality and seeks to 
limit the world of permissible semantic meanings to those that are ordinary.90 
This is not to suggest that semantics or pragmatics play no role when it comes 
to norms at the rule end of the spectrum. Rules make it less likely that a so-
phisticated capacity to understand semantics and pragmatics will be necessary 
to apply the law correctly to a given set of facts.91 
                                                                                                                           
 88 To be sure, existing technology might be able to detect a correlation between the combination 
of the sound waveform “what should I do,” the GPS coordinates at which the sound was detected, the 
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ical linguists. Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt, Defaults in Semantics and Pragmatics, in STANFORD ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/defaults-
semantics-pragmatics/ [https://perma.cc/2ZQ4-CQUW]. 
 90 William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 
540 (2017) (“Many tenets of statutory interpretation take a peculiar form. They allow consideration of 
outside information—legislative history, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.—but only if 
the statute’s text is unclear or ambiguous. These tenets are often expressed as a variation of the ‘plain 
meaning rule.’” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal for a 
Change in Maryland’s Statutes Quo, 43 MD. L. REV. 647, 655 (1984) (describing the plain meaning 
rule as “a popular canon”). 
 91 In this regard, it is possible to draw a parallel between my views and the views of Lee and 
Mouritsen with respect to pragmatics. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary 
Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 816 (2018) (“Literalist semantic meaning alone is not an indication of 
ordinary communicative content. Real human beings do not derive meaning from dictionary defini-
tions and rules of grammar alone. Everyone takes nonsemantic context—pragmatics—into account in 
deriving meaning from language.”). My characterization of the syntactics/semantics/pragmatics triad 
is slightly different than theirs, however. They group syntactics and semantics under formal aspects of 
utterances as opposed to pragmatic aspects and combine syntactics with semantics when they refer to 
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I should note that some scholars have pushed to harness technology to 
expand the realm of cases that could be decided through plain meaning to cap-
ture legal norms that might otherwise suffer from ambiguity. Lee and Mour-
itsen argue that computer-powered corpus linguistics—using computers to ana-
lyze large bodies of natural language data and identify patterns of usage—will 
allow courts to resolve interpretations of statutory meaning in some cases 
when the statute contains language that is not used in a specialized sense.92 
Regardless of whether corpus linguistics is going to be useful, rules are much 
less likely to make resort to contextual features necessary because they tend to 
contain terms that are more precise and are therefore more likely to exhibit 
uniformity of usage. 
Standards, by contrast, place a premium on semantic, and especially-
pragmatic, understanding. They typically enshrine moral and evaluative prin-
ciples, like reasonableness, which are notorious for being objects of disagree-
ment when applied to specific cases.93 The determination of whether a punish-
ment is illegally “cruel”94 might call for complex semantic work, such as con-
sideration of how the concept of cruelness links to the concepts that underlie 
other illegal conduct, such as torture,95 or that underlie legal values, such as dig-
nity.96 Or it might require pragmatic considerations such as whether a punish-
ment is compatible with state commitments to justification, such as proportional-
ity97 or deterrence.98 Thus, a standard makes it hard for a machine to identify 
                                                                                                                           
“semantic meaning.” Id. at 815, 821. I find it useful to make a harder distinction between semantics 
and syntactics; I link semantics to analysis of meaning and, thus, connect it to the effort to teach ma-
chines to process natural language with regard to word meaning rather than the effort to have ma-
chines use syntactical protocols for parsing sequences of characters. And although it is true that both 
syntax and semantics are contexts, the former is a relatively arid one—the rules of syntactical pro-
cessing, such as grammar rules, are less sensitive to extra-textual factors that come from the environ-
ment of the utterer than semantics and pragmatics. 
 92 Id. at 795, 872. 
 93 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 
218 (1999) (discussing the moral criteria of standards). 
 94 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 95 Cf. John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 947 (2011) (“Although one function of such a prohibition was to prevent 
Congress from approving the use of torture, proponents of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
also wanted to prevent the imposition of retroactive punishments and (most relevant for our purposes) 
excessive punishments.”). 
 96 Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”). 
 97 Cf. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (discussing the narrow proportionality princi-
ple in noncapital cases). 
 98 Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (discussing the role of deterrence in a cruel 
and unusual punishment analysis). 
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and execute the correct mode of resolution because that process so often re-
quires recognition of legal semantics or pragmatics. 
To demonstrate this principle, I performed an at-home test with Siri 
(which relies primarily upon syntactical NLP): 
Me: Siri, set up a wake-up alarm tomorrow at 8:00 AM. 
Siri: Your alarm is set for 8:00 AM. 
Me: Siri, set an alarm at a reasonable wake-up time tomorrow. 
Siri: Set the ‘at a reasonable wake up time’ alarm for when? 
Me: At a reasonable time. 
Siri: Set the ‘at a reasonable time alarm’ for when? 
Me: [sigh] 
Does this mean that machines will have to master pragmatics before they can 
reach the correct interpretive outcome under legal standards?99 Almost certain-
ly not. For example, empirical studies in a non-legal context have shown that 
syntactical approaches can sometimes reach the same interpretations of diffi-
cult texts as semantic or pragmatic approaches.100 In a legal context, syntacti-
cally powered natural language searching in Westlaw or Lexis helped propel 
them to be industry leaders.101 This comparatively anemic approach, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 99 It is possible, of course, that the law demands going through the same process to reach an in-
terpretive outcome. 
 100 Google’s BERT system (a deep mind neural network) is able to provide state-of-the art results 
on language understanding and reasoning tests by using predictive models that parse sentences back-
wards and forwards at the same time. John Pavlus, Machines Beat Humans on a Reading Test. But Do 
They Understand?, QUANTA MAG. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.quantamagazine.org/machines-beat-
humans-on-a-reading-test-but-do-they-understand-20191017/ [https://perma.cc/4UHX-CB7R]. BERT 
can even best human performance on advanced reading tests, though it does not rely on networked 
conceptual knowledge. Rather, it constructs trees on whatever patterns it happens to detect in the ma-
terials upon which it is trained. Id. Interestingly, a recent syntactical utilization of BERT improved 
BERT’s performance, potentially even for semantic tasks. Adhiguna Kuncoro et al., Syntactic Struc-
ture Distillation Pretraining for Bidirectional Encoders, 8 TRANSACTIONS ASS’N FOR COMPUTA-
TIONAL LINGUISTICS 776, 783–86 (2020), https://direct.mit.edu/tacl/article/doi/10.1162/tacl_a_00345/
96469/Syntactic-Structure-Distillation-Pretraining-for [https://perma.cc/5FB4-2WBJ]; Reina Qi Wan, 
DeepMind Says Syntactic Biases ‘Helped BERT Do Better,’ SYNCED (May 29, 2020), https://synced
review.com/2020/05/29/deepmind-says-syntactic-biases-helped-bert-do-better/ [https://perma.cc/
GTQ4-34AW]. This result, however, should not be taken to mean that approaches that additionally 
utilize semantic and pragmatic methods will not eventually provide better results. 
 101 Semantic processing is making headway in that space, though experts claim that Westlaw and 
Lexis are primarily syntactical. See Erin Yijie Zhang, Legal Applications of Neural Word Embed-
dings, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://towardsdatascience.com/legal-applications-of-
neural-word-embeddings-556b7515012f [https://perma.cc/5ERG-8EJ5] (describing how word em-
beddings improve semantic understanding in legal information retrieval and comparing that to 
Westlaw and Lexis, which primarily “look[] for literal matches or variants of the query keywords, 
usually by using string-based algorithms to measure the similarity between two text strings.”). 
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increases the risk of error or non-answer, particularly if background data is 
sparse or does not indicate a consensus. 
Eschewing additional and often messy considerations, as rules do, helps 
NLP performance in at least two ways. First, the limitation of discretion makes 
it more likely that the inputs of law and facts and the output of decision form 
statistically significant correlations—rules limit variation by channeling facts 
and connecting them more directly to outcomes.102 This means that a statistical 
relation is more likely to emerge through a simple model of legal analysis, 
even one that uses syntactical parsing of the operative language.103 Second, the 
simplicity of rule content is less likely to force interpreters into a complex web 
of conceptual meaning, either because they rely on bright-line triggers or be-
cause they use content with clearer terminology that provides satisfactory 
meaning without abstraction. Therefore, a simpler semantic ontology might do 
the trick, making hand-crafted semantic approaches more feasible. 
We have covered the basics of the relationship between the rules/standards 
distinction and the costs of automation, but this Article has thus far contem-
plated only pure rules and standards. In the American legal system, pure rules 
and standards are exceptional and impermanent.104 Although rules can become 
more standard-like over time, the centerpiece of this Article is a contemporary 
standard, so my focus will be the inverse process—the rulification of stand-
ards. In the following section, I discuss how the repeated application of stand-
ards can give rise to competing interpretations of that standard, some of which 
are rule-like. 
C. NLP Between Rules and Standards 
Even though norms that are categorizable as legal standards might pose a 
challenge for syntactical or rudimentary semantic NLP techniques, it would be 
unwise to assume that automation of interpretation of those norms is not possi-
ble using technology that currently exists or will exist in the coming decades. 
For one, some norms containing predominantly standard-like norm con-
tent have significant rule content as well, making them fall between pure rules 
and pure standards. Lots of norms fall into this gap: a law might be an impure 
standard such that the language within the norm provides clear direction in a 
relatively small subset of the cases to which it is applied but is typically murky; 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See generally Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure, supra note 39 (analyzing the relative con-
straining power of rules and standards through behavioral experiments). 
 103 See id. 
 104 See, e.g., Richard L. Heppner, Jr., Conceptualizing Appealability: Resisting the Supreme 
Court’s Categorical Imperative, 55 TULSA L. REV. 395, 403 (2020) (“As a result, the various appeal-
ability doctrines are spread along the rules-standards continuum. Few doctrines are pure rules or pure 
standards.”). 
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or it might be an impure rule that provides bright-line guidance within a lim-
ited range of situations but contains material, standard-like exceptions.105 The 
norms might have this in-between character from their initial legislation, but 
they might alternatively develop it over time; each application of the standard 
in a case can create a sub-rule that applies to all factually similar cases, par-
ticularly in a system of precedent.106 To be clear, the norms with these features 
are readily understood as being neither pure rules nor pure standards. 
But what about situations in which there is no consensus that a standard 
has lost its standard-ness? The vagueness of a legal standard might lead to 
competing conceptions of the proper test to be used in the norm, some of 
which might be standard-like and some of which might be rule-like. One way 
that this occurs is when a court announces a new norm for applying a legal 
standard in hope that their norm will constrain future applications within a de-
sired scope.107 A norm of this sort might catch on with other judges to such an 
extent that it becomes the dominant interpretation for all applications of the 
standard, it might be utterly disregarded, or it might fall somewhere in be-
tween.108 This process is repeated whenever other judges announce their own 
supplemental norms, and those too will face one of these three fates. At various 
points in the evolution of a legal standard’s application in the courts, then, 
there may exist for some scope of cases competing interpretations of that 
standard. Some of those interpretations might be rule-like. Thus, the openness 
of standards can create a void that will be filled by norms that are less stand-
ard-like. These norms might come from judges or other influential interpreters, 
such as well-respected scholars or special-interest groups. Indeed, this sort of 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 648 (2014); Russell D. 
Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 447, 490 (2016) 
(discussing sentencing guidelines). 
 106 Coenen, supra note 105, at 648; Covey, supra note 105, at 490. 
 107 See Schauer, supra note 62, at 809–10 (“So when a court, say, makes a standard more precise 
and limits the choices available to that court in future cases, it also limits the choices available to fu-
ture courts in future cases. If the current court anticipates that the future court will make more mistak-
en (from the perspective of the current court) decisions under a standard than the current court antici-
pates that it will itself be constrained by its own rules to make mistaken decisions, then it will have 
good reason, assuming its interest is in maximizing its own policy preferences over time, in imposing 
a rule-based constraint on itself. We could formalize this (more accurately, someone else could for-
malize this), discounting for the fact that neither precedent nor path dependence are insurmountable.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 108 I take this to be an uncontroversial point, but if further explanation is needed about how a 
supplemental norm could be articulated in a system of precedent and not become dominant upon an-
nouncement, I will offer a few ways. For example, the supplement might be offered somewhat timid-
ly, starting as dicta before eventually transforming into the dominant interpretation. Or it could come 
in a decision from a lower or intermediate court, which does not bind the courts higher in the food 
chain. Or, even judges on the same court might not engage in strict observance of horizontal stare 
decisis, so the supplement must vie against those offered by judges’ colleagues. 
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work has historically been the bread and butter of prestigious commentators 
like the American Law Institute.109 In other words, norms that begin as legal 
standards can become marketplaces for interpretation; they can give rise to 
alternative and competing approaches to interpretation, some of which might 
have a rule-like character.110 This might be the case with the RPPT: although 
there is a consensus that the concept of reasonableness at the heart of the 
breach inquiry under negligence doctrine is fairly characterized as a paradig-
matic111 or even pure standard,112 there is not a consensus as to the particular 
conception of reasonableness that should be used for all negligence cases.113 
This competing conception scenario is an alluring one for proponents of 
automation. The prospect of a rule-like conception becoming dominant means 
that what initially appeared to be the most daunting translation of law into 
computer code has transformed into something much more feasible. 
In summary, legal standards pose computational challenges because they 
are more likely to require resorting to pragmatics or complex semantics to ar-
rive at legally permissible interpretations when they are applied to a case. 
Pragmatics and semantics are problematic for automation because existing NLP 
technology is not yet able to meet human performance with respect to those as-
pects of textual interpretation. Despite these challenges, the openness of stand-
ards gives rise to the possibility of rulification—through application of or 
through the introduction of legally permissible, rule-like interpretations of the 
legal standard—which can assist the process of automation. 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See How the Institute Works, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/ 
[https://perma.cc/WLA4-7MNU] (“The Institute’s mission is ‘to promote the clarification and simpli-
fication of the law and its better adaptation to social needs . . . .’”). 
 110 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 
491, 551(1985) (“Moreover, in most jurisdictions, conduct is considered disabling only if it involves 
‘moral turpitude,’ a standard open to competing interpretations.”). 
 111 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
2131, 2133 (2015) (“The word ‘reasonable’ is a paradigmatic example of a standard in the law, and its 
meaning is, if nothing else, vague.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 112 Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 
OR. L. REV. 23, 27–28 (2000) (“The basic negligence requirement of acting as would a ‘reasonable 
person’ is close to a pure standard. The legal pronouncement specifies no facts that would automati-
cally trigger a finding of negligence, and no facts that would trigger a finding of non-negligence. Fur-
thermore, the standard does not even identify facts that would be evidentiary of either outcome.”); cf. 
Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein’s Legal Reasoning and 
Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531, 542 (1997) (book review) (“Perhaps ‘act as would a 
reasonable person’ is the closest we get to a pure standard.”). 
 113 See John Inazu, Beyond Unreasonable, 99 NEB. L. REV. 375, 376 (2020) (“The concept of 
‘reasonableness’ permeates the law: the ‘reasonable person’ determines the outcome of torts and con-
tract disputes . . . . But as any first-year law student can attest, the line between reasonable and unrea-
sonable is not always clear. Nor is that the only ambiguity.” (footnote omitted)). 
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D. Automation and the Value Proposition of Standards 
It remains to explain how the character and dynamics of legal norm con-
tent bears upon the utility of automation of legal interpretation in terms of 
background knowledge, reliability, and compatibility. Arguably, the most im-
portant contribution to this scholarship thus far comes from Anthony Casey 
and Anthony Niblett and, in particular, their claim that machines will lead to 
the end of the rules/standards tradeoff. They believe that machines will lower 
the cost of rule creation by providing an inexpensive means to solve the prob-
lem of path discernment—identifying the best path for conduct change—
thereby enabling the legislation of context-driven rules of narrow scope called 
“microdirectives.”114 
The machine-produced directives Casey and Niblett imagine are clear and 
straightforward and, therefore, offer the constraining power of rules.115 What 
makes them special, however, is that the machine uses its processing power to 
take contextual factors into account; AI will create a host of microdirectives 
tailored to the very particular circumstances faced by those subject to the 
law.116 And they do it quickly. On their account, machines will bear the burden 
of processing contextual data to discern the best path to the desired social out-
come.117 Because machines will someday have the capacity to process this in-
formation at a scale and speed impossible under the existing common law sys-
tem, Casey and Niblett suppose, the automated system better serves the legisla-
tors’ ends than traditional legislative methods.118 That is, legislators will no 
longer face the difficult choice between rules and standards because machines 
will someday enable the legislators to articulate broad objectives cheaply—like 
a standard—with downstream constraining power—like a rule—through the 
automated articulation of context-sensitive directives.119 They hope that a 
broad directive like “minimize sidewalk injuries” will be disambiguated into 
narrowly applying directives to those who find themselves in those situations. 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 
1403 (2017). 
 115 Id. at 1405 (“We describe the rise of microdirectives as the death of rules and standards. One 
might alternatively frame the coming change simply as the death of standards. After all, microdirec-
tives are ex ante rules that govern behavior.”). 
 116 Id. at 1410–12. 
 117 Id. at 1446 (“As standards disappear and judges have progressively less influence, legislative 
intent will be entrenched and concretized in the catalog of microdirectives.”). 
 118 Id. at 1412–14 (“If the predictive technology is very powerful and the machine is able to pro-
vide precise and accurate information, then this points in favor of using the machine to create a rule, 
rather than relying on a judge to adjudicate a standard.”). 
 119 See id. 
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Moreover, these directives will respond to changes in behavior so as to further 
the overall objective.120 
To their credit, Casey and Niblett do not assert that an existing legal sys-
tem could easily be converted to their microdirective approach. They imagine 
that conversion will happen incrementally over time, with administrative agen-
cies playing a role. In particular, they foresee an era in which “[l]egislatures 
may continue to enact standards, but they will leave the machine-aided imple-
mentation to regulators[] . . . [who] will then translate that broad objective into 
specific sets of rules generated by machines.”121 In turn, they predict, legisla-
tures will be able to focus primarily on “stat[ing] their objectives [regarding 
social policy] at increasingly higher levels of abstract[ion] . . . .”122 
This is arguably a fanciful account of our legal future. But, for my pur-
poses here, the value of their work is that it shows how automation might 
change the value proposition for legislators with respect to the factors of back-
ground knowledge, reliability, and compatibility even if a microdirective-based 
legal system never comes into being. 
The realization of Casey and Niblett’s vision would greatly reduce back-
ground knowledge costs, which are ordinarily higher with legal rules than with 
legal standards.123 Artificial intelligence techniques could allow legislators to 
rely on machines to identify patterns of conduct and the environmental condi-
tions in which they occur. Whether from carefully created models or brute 
force processing power, machines can process data and affix statistically de-
termined weight to the behavior correlates of desired outcomes; the success 
rate of prediction increases when the process is capable of automated im-
provement from the acquisition of data regarding prior performance.124 With 
these correlates known, the costs of devising a reliable function for maximiz-
ing their occurrence decrease as well: it is largely a matter of imposing condi-
tions that mandate positive correlates or forbid negative correlates. Of course, 
statistical AI techniques are at the mercy of the availability of data, which 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. at 1433 (“There is a feedback effect. The devices that form part of the Internet of Things 
also collect data on how individuals and corporations behave. Lawmakers can generate even better 
predictions of human behavior by harnessing such data. In doing so, the Internet of Things will further 
reinforce the feasibility of the predictive technology.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).  
 121 Id. at 1437. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 1410 (“Lawmakers will no longer have to think up rules to enact laws. Judges will no 
longer have to examine citizens’ decisions on a case-by-case basis in order to apply laws. And the 
laws will be highly calibrated to policy objectives with no chance of judges introducing bias or in-
competence.”). 
 124 See Lisa L. Harlow & Frederick L. Oswald, Big Data in Psychology: Introduction to the Spe-
cial Issue, 21 PSYCHOL. METHODS 447, 447–57 (2016) (describing several articles that use massive 
data and AI techniques to understand or predict human behavior and personality). 
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might be insufficient to yield useful correlations.125 As time goes on, however, 
it is quite likely that the quantity of collected data will grow126 and the speed of 
data processing and access will increase,127 which will drive performance costs 
down.128 
Secondly, the technology that powers Casey and Niblett’s vision can in-
crease the reliability of interpretation by reducing the number of human inter-
preters that are necessary to convert the standard to a particularized rule. In 
this regard, automation might reduce errors of human cognition or personal 
bias.129 This is not to suggest that automation will always increase reliability. 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See, e.g., Dan McQuillan, People’s Councils for Ethical Machine Learning, 4 SOC. MEDIA + 
SOC’Y 1, 2 (2018) (“Machine learning brings with it another characteristic which can cause or obscure 
harm, which is the opaque nature of its decision-making. As has been pointed out, machine learning 
depends on big data because the training set needs to be large enough to generate a useful predictive 
model.”). 
 126 In just the two-year span between 2017 and 2019, the quantity of worldwide stored data dou-
bled from ten thousand to twenty thousand exabytes. POTOMAC INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., THE FUTURE 
OF DNA DATA STORAGE 6–7 (2018), https://potomacinstitute.org/images/studies/Future_of_DNA_
Data_Storage.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AMM-DUJK] (discussing how the burgeoning field of DNA data 
storage “will usher in a new paradigm for computing with little to no limitations on the volume of data 
that we can produce, store, and access”). 
 127 Matthew Stewart, The Future of Computation for Machine Learning and Data Science, TO-
WARDS DATA SCI. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-future-of-computation-for-
machine-learning-and-data-science-fad7062bc27d [https://perma.cc/LJK9-87FG] (“In summary, the 
future of computation looks like it will involve speeding up computations to handle the relentless and 
exponential increase in data production.”). 
 128 To be clear, I am not saying that increases will be uniform or exponential. Indeed, Moore’s 
Law of Exponential Increase regarding the number of transistors on a chip might have failed in recent 
years as a matter of production, and it appears to have already failed to correspond to exponential 
increases in processing performance. Id. (“However, speeding up individual processors is difficult for 
various reasons, and Moore’s law cannot last forever—it is becoming increasingly constrained by the 
limits of heat transfer and quantum mechanics.”). Rather, my point is modest: over time, these 
measures will tend to go up, and performance costs for the same data task will tend to go down. 
 129 See Chris Chambers Goodman, AI/Esq.: Impacts of Artificial Intelligence in Lawyer-Client 
Relationships, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 149, 150 (2019) (“[AI] can identify and minimize bias in client in-
take and initial consultations, it can assess the uniformity of criminal charging decisions made by 
prosecutors, and it can help to diversify law firm ranks, judicial ranks, and even juror pools. AI can 
also reduce the impacts of implicit bias by providing a mechanism for enhancing empathy, and by 
expanding the scope of information that lawyers rely upon . . . .”); Kimberly A. Houser, Can AI Solve 
the Diversity Problem in the Tech Industry? Mitigating Noise and Bias in Employment Decision-
Making, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 290, 294 (2019) (“The responsible use of artificial intelligence, 
however, can mitigate unconscious bias by reducing the impact of human decision-makers on the 
process, and create better employment decisions which are based on skills, traits and behaviors rather 
than factors (such as sex, race, or pedigree) that do not correlate with merit or success.” (footnote 
omitted)); cf. Avital Mentovich et al., Are Litigation Outcome Disparities Inevitable? Courts, Tech-
nology, and the Future of Impartiality, 71 ALA. L. REV. 893, 898 (2020) (“We find that the shift from 
traditional in-person judicial proceedings to online (or at least differently organized) proceedings 
reduces measured age- and race-based disparities in litigation outcomes.”). But see Rebecca Crootof, 
“Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-In, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 233, 240 
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Sometimes the inverse occurs. For example, there is a growing literature on 
how machine learning techniques that rely and learn from unstructured and 
unmonitored human feedback risk enshrining reprehensible human biases and 
masking them behind opaque algorithms.130 
Finally, an automated system might be able to perform in a way that min-
imizes internal inconsistency or other problems of legal compatibility. For ex-
ample, programmable defeasible logic could be used to resolve conflicts be-
tween rules in the system by setting up a hierarchy of metarules;131 conceiva-
bly, if human legislators select a trumping policy objective, the metarule could 
use that objective as a means to choose one rule over another based on a statis-
tical assessment of the degree to which each rule furthers the goal. 
In conclusion, Casey & Niblett’s vision has been useful to illustrate that 
automation could very well be an economically attractive alternative for legis-
lators because it has the capacity to reduce costs associated with background 
knowledge, reliability, and compatibility. Understanding, as Casey and Niblett 
do, that an automated legal future would come gradually, it serves to consider 
whether automation technology will be of use under existing law, particularly 
those laws that are already stated in abstract terms. Even on their account, 
then, there might come a time where there is piecemeal automation of the legal 
system. Such a project would likely face a crucial and potentially pesky chal-
lenge—the RPPT. 
II. THE COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE REASONABLY PRUDENT PERSON 
TEST AND THE VARIABLE COSTS OF THEIR AUTOMATION 
On the rule/standard continuum, the RPPT is a standard.132 It invokes the 
concepts of “reasonable” and “prudent,” terms that we associate with evalua-
tive judgment. Were computer scientists limited to the face of the test and not 
allowed to consider the supplemental interpretations that have emerged since 
its introduction, then there would be no way for them to handcraft a simple 
rule-based programming structure that would be satisfactory. 
                                                                                                                           
(2019) (“Further, despite its veneer of objectivity, AI will not solve the problem of human bias; it 
incorporates human bias and adds other kinds.”). 
 130 See generally, e.g., SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH 
ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG 
DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); Will Knight, Biased Algo-
rithms Are Everywhere, and No One Seems to Care, MIT TECH. REV. (July 12, 2017), https://www.
technologyreview.com/s/608248/biased-algorithms-are-everywhere-and-no-one-seems-to-care/ 
[https://perma.cc/G66X-K2T9]. 
 131 See Noor Sami Al-Anbaki et al., A Defeasible Logic-based Framework for Contextualizing 
Deployed Applications, 10 INT’L J. ADVANCED COMPUT. SCI. & APPLICATIONS 176, 177 (2019). 
 132 See discussion supra Part I. 
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Helpfully, the RPPT is an old standard,133 and therefore it has given rise 
to competing conceptions of the test within it. Importantly, some of these con-
ceptions are amenable to simple computer programming solutions. Some 
might be solved by today’s state-of-the-art AI while others might require some-
thing a bit beyond today’s AI; and others still call for a leap in technological 
innovation. For the conceptions that might be formalized into computer code 
using something resembling existing techniques, we should first consider their 
cost with respect to two features of legislation: the background knowledge (or, 
in computational terms, background “data”) and the reliability of the function 
that emerges.134 Doing so will reveal that the various interpretations of the RPPT 
under consideration do not hit the cost centers of legislation uniformly. 
Some approaches bring costly background knowledge challenges, such as 
the need for massive amounts of training data. For other approaches, the domi-
nant cost is reliability. For example, the computer’s approach poses a signifi-
cant risk that it will not generate a legal test that brings about desired outcomes 
because it is not adequately sensitive to context. 
Even if background data and reliability problems are surmountable, a fur-
ther complication is that these alternative approaches to RPPT have varying 
degrees of legal acceptability. Some approaches are more popular or more co-
herent with existing laws than others and, therefore, present fewer compatibil-
ity costs. 
In a paper of this size, it would be impossible to perform a fifty-state 
analysis of the evolution of the RPPT over the course of the last century. 
Thankfully, it is unnecessary. Two excellent articles have identified the leading 
alternatives: Patrick Kelly and Laurel Wendt’s What Judges Tell Juries About 
Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions135 and Kevin Tobia’s How 
People Judge What Is Reasonable.136 The former is a comprehensive, fifty-
state review of model jury instructions on the RPPT.137 The latter is an empiri-
cal study of how laypeople judge what is reasonable.138 Therein, Tobia identi-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses, Reasonable Women and Divorce: The Gap Between Real-
ity and the Internal Revenue Code, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 459 (1996) (“The ‘prudent and rea-
sonable man’ first appears in the common law reports in 1856, in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks 
Co. He had been preceded by the ‘man of ordinary prudence,’ first mentioned in Vaughan v. Menlove 
in 1837. His twentieth-century English embodiment, the man on the Clapham omnibus, arrived in 1933, 
in Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, together with his suburban American counterpart, ‘the man who 
takes the magazines at home and in the evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves.’” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 134 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 135 Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of 
Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587 (2002). 
 136 Kevin P. Tobia, How People Judge What Is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L. REV. 293 (2018). 
 137 Kelley & Wendt, supra note 135. 
 138 Tobia, supra note 136. 
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fies predominant reasonableness theories, which he incorporates into his ex-
perimental designs.139 Using these sources, I set forth competing conceptions 
of the RPPT. I then evaluate each conception’s legal compatibility using Kelley 
and Wendt’s work, as well as other sources. For the most part, the conceptions 
are arranged in order of increasing complexity. 
A. Average Conduct 
Tobia explains that one important conception for reasonableness is the no-
tion of averageness, which he characterizes as a statistical approach.140 A small 
number of scholars have claimed that the RPPT asks interpreters to identify 
average141 conduct for the activity in question and, once determined, to make a 
simple assessment of whether the conduct in the instant case fell above or be-
low that line.142 This Average Conduct Conception is most famously attributed 
(fairly or unfairly)143 to Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote in The Common 
Law, “[W]hen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of 
individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the gen-
eral welfare.”144 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 While not adopting the view himself, Christopher Brett Jaeger calls the notion that “reasonable 
behavior is average behavior” the “most basic empirical definition” of the RPPT. Christopher Brett 
Jaeger, The Empirical Reasonable Person, 72 ALA. L. REV. 887, 898 (2021). Averages or means 
might fail to capture the typical conduct of actors as well as medians would, such as when a distribu-
tion is skewed. See MELISSA HARDY & ALAN BRYMAN, HANDBOOK OF DATA ANALYSIS 32–34 
(2004). The “median conduct” conception of the RPPT, however, has not achieved the prominence of 
the “average concept conception.” For those who believe a median approach would be preferable in 
all or a subset of cases, the computational plusses and minuses described in this section would likely 
apply to medians in more or less the same way. 
 142 Cf. Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1041–42 (1994) 
(“But if juries do well when they imagine how the average person would have behaved, it is hard to 
see why they would not do even better if instructed to imagine how the average person would have 
behaved if the risks involved had been to his or her own person or property. The simple single-owner 
heuristic would eliminate the potential gap between average behavior under a negligence rule and 
optimal behavior, and would do so without confusing jargon.”). 
 143 Later in the same text, Holmes changes the articulation, indicating that the standard is what an 
average man would do. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 51 (1881) (“The recon-
ciliation of the doctrine that liability is founded on blameworthiness with the existence of liability 
where the party is not to blame, will be worked out more fully in the next Lecture. It is found in the 
conception of the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and reasonable prudence. Liability is 
said to arise out of such conduct as would be blameworthy in him.”). This is a different test; the con-
duct of the average person might be the same as average conduct, but it might not. An average person 
might only rarely operate complex machinery of a certain type, and they would presumably be far less 
skilled than the average user of that machine. If above average people are the ordinary users, then the 
average conduct might be considerably better than the conduct of the average person. In this section, 
however, I will be focusing on average conduct. 
 144 Id. at 108. 
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1. Background Data and Reliability 
The Average Conduct Conception has two virtues from a computational 
standpoint. 
First, it paves the way to turn the RPPT into a pure rule. On this concep-
tion, the RPPT could be restated thusly: the test for breach is whether a per-
son’s conduct fell below average conduct for the circumstances under consid-
eration. If there are robust statistical measures in those conditions, then the 
RPPT becomes a bright-line test of whether the measured conduct in this case 
violates a numerical minimum or maximum. From that point, the test’s opera-
tion would require simple logical deduction, and even primitive computer pro-
gramming would be sufficient. Imagine something like: “If defendant’s con-
duct X is greater than average Y, then liability attaches.” Or in cases where the 
conduct that played a causal role in the injury is binary (such as whether a per-
son did or did not take a discrete precaution): “If a majority of people perform 
X and defendant did not perform X, then liability attaches.” Assuming that suf-
ficient data is available to determine reliable averages (or majority) conduct in 
comparable settings, there would be little to no risk of processing error, there-
by eliminating an important aspect of reliability costs. 
Second, there are significant contexts in which there may already be suf-
ficient background data to arrive at robust statistical measures of average con-
duct. Take auto accidents, which Nora Freeman Engstrom called “the 800-
pound gorilla of the tort liability system” because they account “for more than 
half of all trials, nearly two-thirds of all injury claims, and three-quarters of all 
damage payouts.”145 There are already enormous stores of data regarding traf-
fic behavior and driving (known as “telematics”), much of it possessed by 
companies that own and license mapping software, such as Google, Facebook, 
and Foursquare,146 or by automobile companies.147 Indeed, for the last several 
years, automobiles have been outfitted with hundreds of sensors, which are 
linked to a persistent internet connection.148 Adding to that, autonomous auto-
                                                                                                                           
 145 Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 293, 295 (2018). 
 146 See, e.g., Paris Martineau, You May Have Forgotten Foursquare, but It Didn’t Forget You, 
WIRED (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/you-may-have-forgotten-foursquare-it-didnt-
forget-you/ [https://perma.cc/Z42F-J4V3]. 
 147 Geoffrey A. Fowler, What Does Your Car Know About You? We Hacked a Chevy to Find Out, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/17/what-does-
your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-chevy-find-out/ [https://perma.cc/Q2KV-A5DP] (“On a recent 
drive, a 2017 Chevrolet collected my precise location. It stored my phone’s ID and the people I called. 
It judged my acceleration and braking style, beaming back reports to its maker General Motors over 
an always-on Internet connection. Cars have become the most sophisticated computers many of us 
own, filled with hundreds of sensors.”). 
 148 Id. 
2290 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2259 
mobiles collect information, not only about themselves, but other drivers as 
well, at the rate of over three terabytes per hour for each vehicle.149 
According to the leading market research firm, International Data Corpo-
ration (IDC), “[t]his data creation will continue to increase as vehicle-to-
vehicle communication becomes commonplace, and as machine learning and 
AI continuously update pattern recognition integrated into vehicles’ intelligent 
driving algorithms.”150 
If accessed, existing driving data could theoretically enable us to arrive at 
reliable statistics regarding average conduct on myriad driving behaviors,151 
such as speed, braking, turning, tire pressure, use of directional or headlights, 
and even movement. Environmental conditions, such as precipitation, wind, 
visibility, and temperature, are similarly tracked and stored by precise loca-
tion.152 Even if sufficient tracking occurs, however, there exist bottlenecks of 
network speed and data processing that must be surmounted.153 As more peo-
ple are tracked and as databases expand, it will likely be harder to upload data 
with sufficient speed and, thereafter, to access that information quickly. It is 
possible, though, that processing speed can keep pace with an increase in data 
scale.154 
                                                                                                                           
 149 DAVID REINSEL ET AL., INT’L DATA CORP., DATA AGE 2025: THE DIGITIZATION OF THE 
WORLD FROM EDGE TO CORE, https://downloads.snapaddy.com/external/seagate-data-age-idc-report-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED3B-3YGJ] (May 2020). 
 150 Id. at 7. 
 151 See generally Xiaoguang Wang et al., Abstract: Built Environment and Driving Outcomes: 
The Case for an Integrated GIS/GPS Approach, 5 INT’L J. APPLIED GEOSPATIAL RSCH. 11 (2014) 
(“This study demonstrates a segment-based approach to integrate GIS and GPS data to address ques-
tions about the connections between the built environment and travel behaviors. . . . This demonstra-
tion showed that fusing GPS and GPS data provides spatial intelligence which can be used to address 
planning, traffic safety, and transportation related issues.”). 
 152 See, e.g., About Our Data, WEATHER UNDERGROUND, https://www.wunderground.com/about/
data [https://perma.cc/3YHL-E35R] (“U.S. current conditions data comes from 180,000+ weather 
stations across the country including: Almost 2,000 Automated Surface Observation System (ASOS) 
stations located at airports throughout the country. . . . Over 250,000 Personal Weather Stations 
(PWS’s) . . . . Stations are put through strict quality controls and observations are updated as often as 
every 2.5 seconds. Over 26,000 weather stations that are part of the Meteorological Assimilation Data 
Ingest System (MADIS) which is managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA).” (emphasis omitted)). 
 It might be wondered whether introducing factors into the statistical analysis removes much of 
the simplicity of the Average Conduct Conception approach. Probably not. So long as there is suffi-
cient background data to show the statistical impact for each of those factors in combination, the pro-
cessing should be able to determine averages or majorities. 
 153 See Seth Noble, 6 Hidden Bottlenecks in Cloud Data Migration, INFOWORLD (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.infoworld.com/article/3268954/6-hidden-bottlenecks-in-cloud-data-migration.html 
[https://perma.cc/P2NN-EM9K]. 
 154 See Aaron Tan, A Peek into the Future of Storage, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Sept. 15, 2020), 
https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/A-peek-into-the-future-of-storage [https://perma.cc/UX8H-
RH4N]. 
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To some readers, this analysis will seem too complex for machines to 
handle. For example, they might wonder how the machine could satisfactorily 
determine that the averages it derives come from comparable circumstances. 
They should remember, however, that the way in which a negligence case pro-
ceeds should lighten the load somewhat. The jury makes its breach determina-
tion only after the parties have selected and submitted evidence to it and, 
thereafter, the jury has found the relevant facts.155 Moreover, the moving party 
will put forth a theory regarding the act or omission that served as the actual 
and proximate cause of the breach.156 Consequently, the breach analysis is sig-
nificantly narrowed, now with a much smaller number of variables under con-
sideration. Of course, the adversary system incentivizes litigants to move the 
battle to the most favorable terrain, and an automated approach to the Average 
Conduct Conception might simply shift the grunt work toward a battle of the 
expert witnesses over which variables ought to matter. But it is at least con-
ceivable that judicial gatekeeping of scientific evidence could drastically limit 
the role of variable selection in the breach determination itself.157 
Other readers might have the inverse concern, wondering why complex 
machine processing might be necessary at all when most streets are already 
subject to bright-line speed limits. If we seek to expedite and lower costs, why 
not use those instead? Although I do not deny that this might be an option, 
courts have been loath to let violation or observation of speed limits, alone, 
                                                                                                                           
 155 See, e.g., Douglass v. Irvin, 531 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), vacated, 549 
N.E.2d 368 (Ind. 1990) (“Should a duty be found to exist, the issues of whether there was a breach of 
duty and whether its breach was the proximate cause of injury are matters to be determined by the fact 
finder after weighing the evidence adduced at trial.”); Kurz v. Kuhn, 223 N.W. 412, 413 (Wis. 1929) 
(“The question, of whether or not the defendant was negligent, can be determined only by the applica-
tion of some standard of care to the conduct of the defendant Kuhn, as disclosed by the evidence. The 
jury must first find the facts, and to those facts apply the instructions of the court as to the law.”). 
 156 See, e.g., Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 258, at 
*4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016) (“Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b), a plaintiff alleging 
negligence must state with particularity the circumstances constituting negligence. ‘When pleading 
negligence, plaintiffs have to meet the heightened standard of Rule 9(b), and must specify a duty, a 
breach of the duty, who breached the duty, what act or failure to act caused the breach, and the party 
who acted.’”(quoting Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 563, at *23 
(Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999))); Pope v. Hancock Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 937 N.E.2d 
1242, 1246–47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., L.L.C., 57 A.3d 582, 596 
(Pa. 2012) (“Generally, to state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts which 
establish the breach of a legally recognized duty or obligation of the defendant that is causally con-
nected to actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.”). 
 157 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (announcing a rule 
that trial judges must act as a safeguard against admission of unreliable expert scientific evidence in 
cases before them). As mentioned in note 7 of this Article, one conceit of this Article is that we can 
assume for the purposes of analysis that other aspects of the torts case will remain human. Of course, 
if complete automation were desired, this hand-off to humans would be unavailable and might in-
crease the overall costs of the Average Conduct Conception. 
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dictate the question of breach. Although some state courts have held that trav-
eling in excess of a speed limit constitutes a breach under operation of negli-
gence per se, others have not, and generally state courts refuse to accept that 
simply traveling under the speed limit is reasonable per se.158 As a result, a 
person’s driving speed is frequently just another piece of evidence under con-
sideration during application of the RPPT: “Exceeding the prima facie speed 
limit . . .  is not negligence per se” but “negligen[ce] in so doing depends upon 
all of the attendant circumstances,”159 and “if the actual and potential hazards 
existing at any particular place on a highway require a speed of less than [the 
legal limit], then the operator should reduce the speed of his automobile at that 
place to whatever is reasonable and prudent under the conditions.”160 Machines 
can engage in statistical techniques to account for the conditions that matter to 
courts; they might control for environmental hazards in determining the con-
duct from which to derive an average. 
Even if we allow vehicle cases to be handled under an Average Conduct 
Conception—and that is not entirely clear—there are many areas of life for 
which we have not yet amassed sufficient background data to arrive at a useful 
figure for Average Conduct. To choose but one illustrative example, there is 
very little data available regarding the operation of amusement park rides (an 
activity likely governed by the RPPT)161 even though injuries therefrom are 
not unusual.162 Suppose that a group of amusement park operators have been 
tracked in detail, perhaps because a single company decided to collect the data 
for performance reviews. The sampled data might not yield sufficiently reliable 
averages for the amusement park field as a whole; generally speaking, the 
smaller the sample size compared to the whole, the higher the margin of error 
and, therefore, the greater the likelihood that the plaintiff’s conduct falls within 
                                                                                                                           
 158 4 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, 
DAMAGES § 12.59 (Matthew Bender & Co., rev. ed. 2021) (“The violation of such a statute is negli-
gence per se in some states and evidence of negligence in others . . . . However, compliance with the 
posted maximum speed limit does not prove due care.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 159 Hiott v. Bishop, 137 S.E.2d 780, 784 (S.C. 1964) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
 160 Thomas v. Barnett, 131 S.E.2d 818, 824 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963). 
 161 See Harlan v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 699 F.2d 521, 524 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding the opera-
tion of “The Wheelie” ride at Six Flags to ordinary care in a negligence suit). 
 162 See Paul Mose, Wet ‘n Wild: When Water Rides Should Be Subject to the Highest Duty of 
Care, 63 KAN. L. REV. 787, 813–14 (2015); Gabrielle Russon, Universal Tested Fixes to Punga Rac-
ers Water Slide as Guest Injuries Piled Up, Court Records Say, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 5, 2020), 
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/tourism/os-bz-volcano-bay-punga-follow-20200804-
dequmqxsnvaatbwmj7zoy5waby-story.html [https://perma.cc/PE73-E8H6] (“At least 115 people were 
hurt on Punga Racers with minor injuries such as scrapes to nosebleeds and others suffering whiplash 
during 13 months from Volcano’s Bay grand opening in late May 2017 to mid-July 2019, earlier court 
documents showed.”). 
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that margin even if it is below the stated average.163 In such cases, it could be 
hard for the court to be confident that the plaintiff breached. 
Moreover, when data collection is highly incomplete, there is a greater 
risk that averages for one context will be forced onto a context that is hetero-
genous, leading to external invalidity.164 In other words, the captured average 
from that sampling might lack the capacity to be usefully applied to a number 
of different amusement park rides or to a number of different rider densities. 
There might be scanty data regarding the frequency with which a Tilt-A-Whirl 
operator looks up from a control panel to evaluate riders’ wellbeing, even if 
there is plenty of data regarding the gaze of Pirate Ship operators. Similar 
problems are likely to arise when industries or contexts have actively resisted 
tracking.165 
And even where there is a willingness to be tracked, some conduct is so 
obscure that a patchwork is the very best data collectors could hope for, at least 
until the proliferation of wearable or implanted data collectors. For example, in 
2006 the Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether the manner in which 
a child mowed a lawn breached ordinary care after a person was allegedly hit 
by debris jettisoned by the lawnmower.166 Although there is a chance that lawn 
mower paths will be tracked and coded into a dataset—there are already GPS 
trackers in robotic lawnmowers(!)167—important aspects of lawn mowing that 
do not involve devices are likely to arise and be material to a breach inquiry. 
                                                                                                                           
 163 WILLIAM MENDENHALL, III ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 313 
(Michelle Julet ed., Brooks/Cole, Cengage Learning 14th ed. 2013) (“In a statistical estimation prob-
lem, the accuracy of the estimate is measured by the margin of error or the width of the confidence 
interval, both of which have a specified reliability. Since both of these measures are a function of the 
sample size, specifying the reliability and accuracy allows you to determine the necessary sample 
size.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 164 See, e.g., Jorge Faber & Lilian Martins Fonseca, How Sample Size Influences Research Out-
comes, DENTAL PRESS J. ORTHODONTICS, 2014 July–Aug., at 27, 27–29 (“Very small samples un-
dermine the internal and external validity of a study.”); Elizabeth Tipton et al., Implications of Small 
Samples for Generalization: Adjustments and Rules of Thumb, 41 EVALUATION REV. 472, 472–505 
(2016) (“In small random samples, large differences between the sample and population can arise 
simply by chance and many of the statistics commonly used in generalization are a function of both 
sample size and the number of covariates being compared.”). 
 165 Cf. Natalie Kitroeff & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Airlines Refused to Collect Passenger Data 
That Could Aid Coronavirus Fight, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/business/
coronavirus-airlines-contact-tracing-cdc.html  [https://perma.cc/TDA4-RR29] (Apr. 29, 2020) (“Pub-
lic health officials have been pushing airlines for years to gather more traveler data, but airlines have 
balked, citing cost and time.”). 
 166 Campbell v. Kovich, 731 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006). 
 167 Ashlee Clark Thompson, Robotic Lawn Mowers Get Voice Assistant, GPS Upgrades, CNET 
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/robotic-lawn-mowers-getting-amazon-alexa-google-
assistant-gps-upgrades/ [https://perma.cc/4XLC-EAMB]. 
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Indeed, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that a youth lawnmower had in-
spected the grass beforehand in concluding that there was no breach.168 
To be sure, a simple closure rule could be used to improve reliability. 
Courts could decide, for example, that conduct below the stated average yet 
within the margin of error does not meet the burden under RPPT. Or they 
could place the burden to produce a suitably reliable average (as determined by 
a preset battery of statistical tests) on the moving party. Such rules, however, 
risk allowing careless, cavalier, or uncaring conduct to go unpunished simply 
because it is unique. If that were to occur too often, this approach might be 
viewed as too unreliable by legislators. 
Thus, it is likely that such a system would have holes, though those holes 
would likely shrink as the tracking data of day-to-day life expands. 
2. Compatibility 
Although the Average Conduct Conception is somewhat promising from a 
computational standpoint, it suffers from problems of legal compatibility. In 
the 1920s, Francis Bohlen, drafter of the First Restatement of Torts, famously 
wrote the following: 
Were the “reasonable man” identical with the average man and were 
the question what the average conduct of mankind under similar cir-
cumstances is, the question would be purely one of fact—of what is 
or exists—though involving an enormously extended inquiry as to the 
conduct of all other men or a great number of other men under similar 
circumstances. But the “reasonable man” is not the average man.169 
There are no state model jury instructions that invoke “average” conduct, and 
only one describes the conduct of the “average person.”170 Instead, model jury 
instructions commonly state that “[t]he law does not say what a reasonably 
careful person using ordinary care would or would not do under such circum-
stances. That is for you to decide.”171 This is not to suggest that evidence re-
garding average conduct is not relevant to the breach determination, it is likely 
that most states would admit such evidence.172 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See Campbell, 731 N.W.2d at 115–16 (considering the youth’s inspection in the breach analy-
sis). 
 169 FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 603–04 (1926). 
 170 Kelley & Wendt, supra note 135, at 625–80, 671 (South Carolina). 
 171 Id. at 608 (quoting MODEL CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 10.02 (MICH. SUP. CT. 1981)). 
 172 See Cucinella v. Weston Biscuit Co., 265 P.2d 513, 515, 520–21 (Cal. 1954) (providing a split 
decision with majority finding no error on admission of evidence of average speed for determination 
of pedestrian’s contributory negligence, but with dissenting judge strenuously arguing “[i]t has been 
held numerous times by this Court and by appellate courts of this state that the question of negligence 
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Nor does average conduct appear to match how jurors actually interpret 
the RPPT. Neal Feigenson’s studies of juror behavior indicate that jurors fol-
low a holistic approach, taking in facts, including those that do not appear to 
be relevant, in assessing whether an actor failed to do what others within that 
culture usually do.173 These results are consistent with Tobia’s experiments. He 
asked subjects to indicate a quantitative value in connection with over a dozen 
items, such as the number of weeks to wait for a criminal trial or the number of 
times that a person calls his or her parents in a month, varying whether they 
were asked to assess the “average,” “ideal,” or “reasonable” value for those 
items.174 In one of the three experiments, subjects’ values for “average” were 
not a significant predictor of the “reasonable” value, but other values, such as 
the value that subjects gave for “ideal,” or a combination of “ideal” and “aver-
age” values, were significant predictors.175 In the remaining two experiments, 
“average” was a significant predictor, but so were “ideal” and a combination of 
“ideal” and “average,” and this combination had greater explanatory power 
than “average.”176  
Thus, an automated RPPT in the mold of the Average Conduct Concep-
tion would likely meet considerable resistance even if it were to produce relia-
ble, representative averages. Though it has been discussed by legal luminaries, 
it has never achieved mainstream acceptance. For this to be an attractive 
choice, then, it would have to be because of its technological strengths. All 
things considered, the Average Conduct Conception giveth and taketh away: 
there are important areas in which reliable averages could be found with feasi-
                                                                                                                           
. . . is not to be determined by what others did or did not do at the time and place under the particular 
facts and circumstances then and there confronting them”). 
 173 NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 17 
(2000). 
 174 Tobia, supra note 136, at 320–25. 
 175 Id. at 323. 
 176 Id. at 321, 326. I would like to note that Jaeger’s recent and impressive series of experiments 
provided support for the notion that laypeople’s understanding of reasonableness is linked to the per-
centage of people who perform the conduct in question. Jaeger, supra note 141, at 931–32 (finding in 
four experiments that subjects “who were told that 90% of people in the defendants’ position would 
have avoided injuring the plaintiff found the defendant negligent 77.3% of the time” but subjects 
“who were told that 10% of people would have avoided injuring the plaintiff . . . found the defendant 
negligent only 50.5% of the time”). Importantly, Jaeger’s experiments were designed to determine 
whether “economic” or “empirical” views of reasonableness received more support among partici-
pants in the study, and to determine whether, among empirical views, participants were more likely to 
adopt an “aspirational” or “average” view of reasonableness. Id. at 910–33. Although his results re-
garding economic views will be important when I consider the Learned Hand Test, they are of limited 
utility in this section because Jaeger understandably did not draw the distinction between average 
conduct, the conduct of the average person, or (in that vein) conduct that has formed a convention due, 
in part, to its commonness. As a consequence, his results do not indicate whether the Average Con-
duct Conception receives more support than its closest rival under consideration here, the Convention-
alist Conception. 
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ble background data costs, but it suffers from gaps and lack of legal support 
that affect its soundness as a legal approach. 
B. The Learned Hand Test 
Another conception of the RPPT is economic cost-benefit testing or, more 
popularly, the Learned Hand Test (Hand Test).177 Tobia characterizes this con-
ception as a prescriptive theory because it has a normative justification for the 
results provided.178 To be sure, the Hand Test has been embraced as an ideal 
for efficiency or welfare maximization and as a practical reform, but a small 
number of scholars have maintained that the Hand Test is the very best de-
scription of the RPPT in torts doctrine.179 
The test is well-known: breach should be determined by an assessment of 
whether the precaution that allegedly should have been taken by the defendant 
was more burdensome than the utility it would have yielded from the ex ante 
perspective, and this is measured by the probability that loss would occur times 
the size of that loss.180 In short, the burden must be less than the expected val-
ue of liability costs. Thus, the Hand Test is a bright-line rule. 
1. Background Data and Reliability 
The Hand Test is a mathematical formula—a promising starting point for 
computerization. Much like the Average Conduct Conception, the Hand Test 
poses no processing challenge once numerical values are plugged into it. So 
long as those values are reliable, the implementation of the formula will not 
introduce new statistical or computational errors. Indeed, decades-old comput-
ers could handle it with aplomb. In distinguishing the Hand Test from the Av-
erage Conduct Conception, then, the question is how gathering and processing 
background data regarding probabilities of injury, liability costs from injury, 
and the cost of taking the necessary precaution differ from doing the same with 
respect to average conduct. 
Real-world application of the Hand Test has yielded some insight into its 
weaknesses. Identifying the specific values of its variables has proven diffi-
cult.181 In rare cases, the answer under the test is obvious, making the precision 
                                                                                                                           
 177 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 178 Tobia, supra note 136, at 303. 
 179 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 85–86 (1987); cf. Alex Stein, The Domain of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 535 (2017) (offering a 
twist on the Hand Test, limiting the descriptive theory to instances in which the benefits of harm-
causing activity are public). 
 180 See Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. 
 181 Peter Z. Grossman et al., Uncertainty, Insurance and the Learned Hand Formula, 5 L., PROB-
ABILITY & RISK 1, 2–3 (2006) (“Before the fact of an accident, individuals often do not know, even 
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of the individual variables less important.182 Nevertheless, as Judge Richard A. 
Posner stated four decades ago in McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., ordinary cas-
es do not lend themselves to clear results and, thus, face problems of obscurity: 
Ordinarily . . . the parties do not give the jury the information re-
quired to quantify the variables that the Hand Formula picks out as 
relevant. That is why the formula has greater analytic than opera-
tional significance. Conceptual as well as practical difficulties in 
monetizing personal injuries may continue to frustrate efforts to 
measure expected accident costs with the precision that is possible, 
in principle at least, in measuring the other side of the equation—the 
cost or burden of precaution.183 
The analysis of probability in the formula is essentially an actuarial assessment 
of the likelihood of events, such as the one suffered by the plaintiff (and those 
that might be avoided with the measure) and the affixation of price to the pre-
caution in question.184 Assuming that the implementation of the automated 
Hand Test would include arriving at figures for those variables, the computer 
program would require a tremendous amount of background data to perform 
that task for each and every situation. 
Perhaps existing technology is up to the challenge. There are over twenty-
five thousand actuaries in the United States alone.185 They hold a tremendous 
amount of information, perhaps enough to power the Hand Test if courts were 
somehow granted access to it.186 Over a decade ago, before machine learning 
gained a foothold in the workplace, scholars Peter Grossman, Reed Cearley, 
and Daniel Cole asserted that actuarial work in the insurance industry “pro-
vides much of the information that courts need to apply the marginal Learned 
                                                                                                                           
within a rough approximation, the probability that they will have an accident. Nor do they know the 
likely harm should an accident occur. That is to say, they do not possess the information the Learned 
Hand formula requires them to possess in order to perform the requisite ex ante calculations.”). 
 182 See, e.g., R.I. Hosp. Tr. Nat’l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 295 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(demonstrating an instance where the measure taken would have yielded no protection from loss at 
all). 
 183 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 184 See Grossman et al., supra note 181, at 2–3. 
 185 See Occupational Outlook Handbook: Actuaries, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.
bls.gov/ooh/math/actuaries.htm [https://perma.cc/Z96A-ZLXK] (Apr. 9, 2021). 
 186 This would not be easy. Most actuaries are employed by insurance companies, which value 
actuarial work so highly that they consider it a trade secret. Id.; Insurent Agency Corp. v. Hanover Ins. 
Co., No. 16-CV-3076, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2565, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2020) (holding that 
actuarial data are trade secrets); Xavian Ins. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., No. 18cv8273, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65067, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16. 2019) (same); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Am. 
Viatical Servs., L.L.C., No. 05-CV-2343, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82210, at *3–4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 
2007) (same); Destiny Health, Inc. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 39 N.E.3d 275, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2015) (same).  
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Hand formula in negligence cases.”187 Today, machine learning techniques 
have been adopted by the insurance industry to improve the accuracy of actu-
arial work.188 Although that industry continues to debate the utility and value 
of machine learning approaches (which can use brute force processing and big 
data189 in unsupervised learning without the burdens of traditional inference 
assumptions) compared to bedrock actuarial techniques (which are bound by 
traditional inference assumptions),190 there is evidence that the former will win 
the day eventually, if it has not already.191 
In that vein, legal scholars have expressed optimism that big data can be 
tapped to create more accurate norms regarding a machine-generated standard 
of optimal care. Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat believe that machines using 
big data can overcome information costs in creating a personalized standard of 
care based on a variety of individualized factors.192 Although they do not con-
sider whether big data could power an objective rule, such as the Hand Test, 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Grossman et al., supra note 181, at 1. The authors go on to say the following about the capaci-
ty to update information bearing upon the risk of liability:  
Further, these processed [insurance] claims provide the industry with a continual stream 
of information about the probability curve surrounding the liability variable, L, of the 
Learned Hand formula, which permits continual updating of [the expected value of the 
harm]. That information, which is not possessed by the individual injurers and victims 
because of diseconomies of scale, increases the general foreseeability of the harm. In 
other words, the insurance industry has the necessary information to reasonably antici-
pate the potential harm for a selected type of accident.  
Id. at 16. 
 188 See Alexander Cherry, Artificial Intelligence and the Actuary of the Future, REUTERS 
EVENTS, https://www.reutersevents.com/insurance/analytics/artificial-intelligence-and-actuary-future 
[https://perma.cc/3FSK-3SSB] (“Cast your eye down your newsfeed and one thing is clear: Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) has arrived in insurance. From natural-language processing and chatbots for claims 
resolution to big data and algorithms in the actuarial back office, it seems there is barely a cog in the 
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ANCE COMPANIES (Marine Corlosquet-Habart & Jacques Janssen eds., 2018) (illustrating the profound 
impact of big data and machine learning upon the insurance industry).  
 189 I follow the technologist definition, “Big data is high-volume, high-velocity and/or high-
variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing that 
enable enhanced insight, decision making, and process automation.” Gartner Glossary: Big Data, 
GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data/ [https://perma.cc/58Q8-EPQU]. 
 190 Warren Franklin, Machine Learning Algorithm vs. Actuarial Science . . . Who Will Win?, TO-
WARDS DATA SCI. (Aug. 5, 2016), https://towardsdatascience.com/machine-learning-algorithm-vs-
actuarial-science-who-will-win-b203f31145ce [https://perma.cc/763M-TFCP]. 
 191 See Guojun Gan & Emiliano A. Valdez, An Empirical Comparison of Some Experimental 
Designs for the Valuation of Large Variable Annuity Portfolios, 4 DEPENDENCE MODELING (SPECIAL 
ISSUE: RECENT DEVS. QUANTITATIVE RISK MGMT.) 382, 382–400 (2016) (arguing that machine 
learning provides speed and accuracy when evaluating multiple annuities in a portfolio simultaneously 
compared to actuarial techniques). 
 192 Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 
(2016). 
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they assert that it could power an even more ambitious subjective regime that 
relies on similar variables, such as one that “seeks to distinguish people ac-
cording to their tendencies to create risks and their capabilities to prevent 
them.”193 In this regard, they are confident that machines can identify particu-
larized risks of harm. In another article, Lior Strahilevitz joins Porat in ad-
dressing big data’s capacity to generate particularized assessments of price, 
claiming that “[f]irms could use what they know about their customers to pro-
vide them with personalized default terms and prices in contracts that are de-
termined at the time a contract is entered into and which any customer could 
see before she executes the contract.”194 
A significant portion of the useful195 information stored under the umbrel-
la of big data is the collection of data regarding purchases and purchase price. 
There are over 112 million Americans who are users of Amazon’s Prime sub-
scription service alone, which is more than half the number of adults in the 
country, and Prime members have spent an average of fourteen hundred dollars 
on Amazon per year.196 There can be little doubt that the acceleration of online 
purchasing during the COVID-19 pandemic has only inflated these num-
bers.197 Even five years ago, the Obama Administration raised red flags about 
harnessing big data to increase price discrimination at the individual level, 
warning, “Big data allows companies to collect more information about cus-
tomers and use it to create new kinds of measures, raising the likelihood differ-
ential pricing will become more common and more personalized over time.”198 
The same AI that is used to predict consumer behavior and optimize pricing 
could be used to identify costs for taking a protective measure at the critical 
moment in time. Although most of these databases are inaccessible to the gov-
                                                                                                                           
 193 Id. at 679. 
 194 See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with 
Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1440 (2014). 
 195 Most stored data is redundant or otherwise useless. Veritas Global Databerg Report Finds 85% 
of Stored Data Is Either Dark or Redundant, Obsolete, or Trivial (ROT), VERITAS (Mar. 15, 2016), 
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[https://perma.cc/E676-NXM9] (reporting that “Amazon purchases ballooned in 2020—it delivered 
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 198 Jason Furman & Tim Simcoe, The Economics of Big Data and Differential Pricing, THE 
WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: BLOG (Feb. 6, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/blog/2015/02/06/economics-big-data-and-differential-pricing [https://perma.cc/R7A2-BCUZ]. 
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ernment, it is easy to imagine that courts might someday gain access, whether 
through discovery, party submission, or other means. 
There will be both technical and social challenges, however. As to the 
former, the same problems with data-related bottlenecking under the Average 
Conduct Conception exist here as well.199 As to the latter, aspects of the Hand 
Test are difficult to assess in dollar terms regardless of the quality or quantity 
of data, such as the value of human life.200 
Having discussed existing resources, we are ready to return to the ques-
tion of how the Hand Test compares to the Average Conduct Conception. 
Considering background knowledge, despite having more variables, it is 
not clear that the Hand Test conception is any better or worse than the Average 
Conduct Conception. There exist impressive data collections for both, though 
they are largely in the possession of private companies. And there are likely to 
be areas for which little data is collected until tracking technology becomes 
more widespread. 
The bigger distinction between the two approaches is reliability. Recall 
that when conduct is infrequent, the statistical reliability of an average for that 
conduct tends to go down.201 Under the Hand Test, by contrast, the uncom-
monness of an accident is built into the analysis: infrequency is represented in 
lower values for the probability variable.202 Thus, the negative impact of infre-
quency on reliability is potentially mitigated—if something is infrequent, the 
impact of price reliability goes down as well because the formula multiplies 
that price by a much smaller number.203 It might be objected that infrequency 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 200 Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encom-
passing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 924–25 (2001) (“If too low a 
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is still the problem, particularly because the Average Conduct Conception is 
not the only rival here. Infrequent events can, at one time, seem low risk due to 
their rarity, but, at a later date when they become more frequent, be properly 
understood as high risk. There might be a lag before the true riskiness can be 
incorporated into the test. For example, the sudden popularity of the hover-
board during the Christmas season of 2015 gave rise to so many accidents that it 
effectively doubled the annual number of injuries associated with devices of that 
sort.204 Importantly, however, the Hand Test is about available evidence from the 
ex ante perspective,205 so the possibility of a change in frequency revealing that 
people have mistakenly evaluated risk is of no import in the analysis. 
To be clear, this does not eliminate a weakness that is also suffered by the 
Average Conduct Conception—namely, that some areas of life are not tracked 
at all, so an automated assessment of risk or of the cost of the precaution will 
have a high risk of error or non-answer. As with the Average Conduct Concep-
tion, however, these areas of life will likely shrink over time. 
2. Compatibility 
Turning to legal compatibility, there can be little question that the Hand 
Test is a marginalized conception of the RPPT under law, despite being some-
what more popular than the Average Conduct Conception.206 Although aspects 
of the test have become enshrined as requirements for design or warning de-
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Brianna L. Siracuse et al., Hoverboards: A New Cause of Pediatric Morbidity, 48 INJURY: 
INT’L J. CARE INJURED 1110, 1112 (2017) (showing an increase of 400% for injuries associated with 
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gence cases. . . . Yet, rather than telling juries to balance the costs and benefits of greater care, courts 
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benefit analysis in reviewing negligence cases. . . . Some scholars claim that these practices demon-
strate that the actual meaning of negligence in American law is defined by a reasonable person stand-
ard that marginalizes or even supplants the Hand Formula.” (footnote omitted)). 
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fects in products liability cases in many states,207 courts generally do not ask 
jurors to use it in cases of negligence.208 The exception is Louisiana, which 
embraced the test in Dobson v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.209 A handful of 
other states embrace the doctrine of changing expected legal duties according 
to the amount of foreseeable risk, but they do not set out a cost-benefit test.210 
That is, there are higher duties for riskier activities in those jurisdictions, but 
there is no requirement that the Hand Test be used.211 
Moreover, there is little evidence that the Hand Test is how jurors under-
stand the RPPT. Twenty years ago, Kip Viscusi performed a survey experiment 
of 500 juror-eligible Americans and found they did not do well in following 
the Hand Test when making negligence judgments.212 He concluded that “[t]he 
underlying theme throughout these results is . . . that jurors make errors that 
are inconsistent with the usual law and economics principles [like the Hand 
Test]” and frequently pay little attention to a company’s assessment of risk lev-
el or cost per life saved.213 More recently, Christopher Jaeger performed a se-
ries of experiments in which he sought to investigate how much layperson neg-
ligence determinations were swayed by either cost-benefit analysis or by statis-
tics regarding the percentage of people who would have undertaken a safety 
measure to avoid accident.214 Each time, higher percentages of accident avoid-
ance correlated significantly with decreases in the likelihood that laypeople 
would find negligence but no such correlation was found with increased results 
under a Hand Test analysis.215 Jaeger explained, “Participants did not seem to 
care whether precautions were cost-justified under the Hand Formula. Partici-
pants found the defendant negligent 66.5% of the time when the precautions 
were cost-justified, and 63.3% of the time when the precautions were not.”216 
Judges and scholars have attributed states’ unwillingness to adopt the 
Hand Test to a number of things: (1) that it is too difficult for fact-finders to 
                                                                                                                           
 207 See 2 CARY STEWART SKLAREN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.03 (Matthew Bender & Co., rev. 
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assess price, harm, and probability;217 (2) that jurors would find cost-benefit 
assessment distasteful and engage in jury nullification;218 (3) that values are 
fatally difficult to quantify or are incommensurate;219 and (4) that economic 
rationality is not a demand of tort law.220 It would serve to briefly address how 
automation of the RPPT might respond to those concerns. 
The first concern is not particularly weighty in this analysis so long as 
machines can perform the test more reliably. Assuming that background data 
are sufficient to give reliable values, there is little doubt that a math-powered 
machine will outperform a juror on that score. 
The second concern, too, is to be accorded little weight here; one virtue of 
machines is their incapacity to violate their own programming, so there is no 
risk of nullification. That will do nothing to change public reaction to the dis-
tastefulness of its application. For instance, the test can impose lighter burdens 
on actors who put the lives of poorer people at risk because injuries to that 
population can be compensated for lower cost, making the liability cost varia-
ble smaller.221 To be sure, this is a problem that exists elsewhere in the torts 
system—it owes much to the manner in which assessments for damages 
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awards are made222—but the Hand Test builds this feature into the threshold 
for breach, exacerbating the problem.223 
The third concern is unlike the first two in an important respect. Although 
the rigidity of an automated Hand Test is fairly viewed as an asset with respect 
to the first two arguments, the inverse is true here: the mechanical nature of the 
test increases the risk that it will seek to commensurate that which many be-
lieve to be incommensurable, leading to controversial outcomes. Learned 
Hand, himself, doubted that the formula could be used mechanically. In Con-
way v. O’Brien, he described the likelihood of injury as “practically not sus-
ceptible of any quantitative estimate” and the cost of the measure taken and of 
liability exposure as “generally not [susceptible of any quantitative estimate], 
even theoretically” because “a solution always involves some preference, or 
choice between incommensurables.”224 It is true that Hand could scarcely have 
imagined the amount of data and the speed of data processing that exists today, 
but that does not remove the problem with respect to certain classes of injury, 
such as the previously discussed example of loss of human life.225 
The fourth concern is not eased by automation either. Although scholars, 
particularly those who self-identify as operating in the field of law and eco-
nomics, argue that the Hand Test ought to be the way to determine breach, few 
scholars maintain that it is the way juries determine breach.226 
It is fair to say, then, that although automation could make the Hand Test 
more viable, it will be difficult to convince lawmakers that it is an extant di-
rective in American tort law, it might bring about unpopular outcomes, and it 
might run counter to more dominant rival conceptions. 
C. Conventionalism 
Another candidate conception is the Conventionalist Conception.227 
Thereunder, the test for determining satisfaction of the RPPT is grounded in 
emergent conventions of conduct in the community or jurisdictional area.228 
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Conventionalism is a philosophical doctrine that takes on many guises, so 
there is a risk that my discussion of Conventionalist Conceptions of the RPPT 
might be confused for theories regarding fundamental matters such as legali-
ty229 or legal objectivity230 that share the same label and some of the same fea-
tures. In the context of RPPT, the Conventionalist Conception asserts there is a 
form of public agreement or consensus in the community that provides norma-
tive support for the conclusion that the duty of ordinary care was or was not 
breached.231 On this account, the RRPT is a call to jurors to view the facts 
through the lens of the values that exist in their community, either historically, 
today, or some hybrid of the two. 
The thorny thing about the Conventionalist Conception is that it is not 
simply a test that calls the interpreter to identify common conduct, so merely 
identifying whether there is a range of median behavior in a normal distribu-
tion is not enough. Inasmuch as it is conventionalist, the conception involves 
the complex task of looking for not only regularities of behavior, but a value 
system that views failure to conform to those regularities as worthy of criti-
cism or punishment.232 For example, a norm could become apparent from re-
view of private conversation, pop culture items, and scholarship, and that norm 
might be a standard of criticism for certain categories of conduct. Although there 
continues to be philosophical debate about the rationality of supposing that con-
ventions of this sort can create obligations or are otherwise reason-giving, 233 the 
resolution of that debate is of little consequence here so long as conventions are 
identifiable and the RPPT operates as an authoritative directive to render a deci-
sion under the applicable convention in cases of negligence. 
                                                                                                                           
tort judgments without transferring from the community to the judges the authority to define and 
change those norms. The system relied heavily on what we might call ‘covering generalities’ to refer 
to, but not to specify, the conventional norms. The system also used a procedure that left the ultimate 
judgment to the community-representing jury.”). 
 229 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST 
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 68 (2001); ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VAL-
UES 4–5 (2001). 
 230 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 191–96 (1985) (discussing 
a Conventionalist approach to constitutional interpretation). 
 231 See Kelley, Who Decides?, supra note 228, at 318. (“First, there must be a social convention 
or coordinating norm intended to protect people like plaintiff from a particular hazard.”). 
 232 Id.; see also DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 78 (1969); Richard H. 
McAdams, Conventions and Norms: Philosophical Aspects, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 844, 844–49 (2d ed., Elsevier 2015). 
 233 See Leslie Green, Positivism and Conventionalism, 12 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 35, 35–52 (1999); 
Christopher P. Taggart, How Can ‘Positivism’ Account for Legal Adjudicative Duty?, 33 OXFORD J.L. 
STUD. 169, 179–82 (2013). 
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1. Background Data and Reliability 
The computerization of the Conventionalist Conception poses challenges, 
not only with respect to the reliability of processing, but also with the collec-
tion of the background data that will inform that processing. 
The good news for proponents of automation is that the Conventionalist 
Conception asserts that community values are social facts.234 At least theoreti-
cally, then, the identification of the content of a community value is an act that 
can be done by non-evaluative processing of descriptive data. On this account, 
applying the RPPT does not require deep, context-sensitive moral evaluation, a 
task that is well beyond the capacities of today’s computers.235 The bad news is 
that these facts are still very challenging to find. 
The formulation of an operation for the identification of community val-
ues is a difficult matter. Tort doctrine, itself, provides precious little guidance 
regarding protocols for convention identification,236 but there are relevant re-
sources in scholarship across disciplines. The most famous approach is from 
philosopher David Lewis, who sets forth necessary conditions for a convention 
to arise: 
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when 
they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only 
if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in any in-
stance of S among members of P, 
 (1) everyone conforms to R; 
 (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; 
 (3) everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding 
all possible combinations of actions; 
 (4) everyone prefers that everyone conform to R, on condition 
that at least all but one conform to R; 
 (5) everyone would prefer that everyone conform to R′, on con-
dition that at least all but one conform to R′,  
                                                                                                                           
 234 This is not to suggest that all theories have this character. Indeed, scholars debate whether the 
standard calls for descriptive analysis or normative judgment. See Zipursky, supra note 111, at 2133. 
 235 See discussion infra Part II.D.1. 
 236 Torts doctrine does elaborate upon a close cousin of conventions—namely, customs. “A cus-
tom [in tort law] is a widespread and, for some courts, nearly universal practice[,]” according to torts 
scholar Kenneth Abraham. Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1784, 1788 (2009) (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 163, at 394 
(2000)). This concept, which is little more than simple numerousness, is thinner than the concept of 
conventionalism that I will describe in this section, but I do discuss custom where relevant. 
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where R′ is some possible regularity in the behaviour of members of 
P in S, such that no one in any instance of S among members of P 
could conform both to R′ and to R.237 
Classic Lewis Conventionalism, although systematic, is overengineered for the 
RPPT. The first condition stands out for requiring that everyone conform. 
Commonness is an important aspect of the Conventionalist account of RPPT, 
but its proponents do not assert that the formation of a convention demands 
complete conformity. For instance, it is well-settled that evidence of what is 
usual or customary is admissible on the issue of negligence.238 Torts scholar 
Kenneth Abraham, explained, “Although the courts rarely engage in an express 
headcount, discussions of the custom rule seem to me to presuppose that a 
practice must be followed by at least a majority of relevant actors in order to 
qualify as a custom.”239 For their part, philosophers have departed from Lewis 
on this score, claiming that he has set the bar too high.240 Indeed, perfect con-
formity raises the question of why there would be a need to set up legal en-
forcement at all. In later decades, Lewis heard his critics and softened his ap-
proach, claiming that conventions must merely hold for “almost all” members of 
a “subpopulation.”241 Thus, it is fair to say that Conventionalist accounts do not 
generally require that conventions exist countrywide or across the entire popula-
tion of a jurisdiction—the scope need only be the relevant community.242 
The second aspect of Lewis’s approach that seems incongruous with the 
formation of an RPPT convention is his insistence on people in the population 
accepting the convention on a set of strategic conditions. It should be obvious 
from conditions four and five that Lewis presumes a game-theoretic basis for 
conventions, wherein they arise out of rational strategy and result in stability 
through mutual-self-interested equilibrium.243 In other words, Lewis’s condi-
tions serve both to describe the attributes of conventions and to ensure that 
those who create a convention have done so sensibly and strategically in coor-
                                                                                                                           
 237 This concise articulation comes from JP Smit, An Alternative to the Lewisian View of Conven-
tions, 46 STELLENBOSCH PAPERS LINGUISTICS 141, 141–42 (2016) (emphasis omitted) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting LEWIS, supra note 232, at 76). 
 238 E.g., Ludman v. Davenport Assumption High Sch., 895 N.W.2d 902, 917 (Iowa 2017). 
 239 Abraham, supra note 236, at 1788 n.9. 
 240 Smit, supra note 237. 
 241 David Lewis, Convention: Reply to Jamieson, 6 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 113, 116 (1976). 
 242 Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña & Josep M. Vilajosana, Introduction to LEGAL CONVENTIONALISM 
1–5 (Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña & Josep M. Vilajosana eds., 2019) (using Lewis as a point of departure 
in setting the scope for convention at the level of a given community and requiring the presence of 
recurring behavior, belief that existence of this behavior is a reason to follow it, and a set of expecta-
tions of these circumstances). 
 243 See Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden, Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A 
Reconstruction of David Lewis’ Game Theory, 19 ECON. & PHIL. 175, 175–210 (2003). 
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dination. Philosophers have criticized Lewis’s notion that conventions must 
arise from consciousness of a game or with an understanding of how the con-
vention came to arise, 244 and it is difficult to see how these conditions would 
be necessary for interpreting the content of the RPPT. Considering the test, 
itself, breach in ordinary negligence does not turn on the reasons that someone 
conforms to reasonableness; rather, it turns on whether that person acted rea-
sonably.245 If the test, itself, does not demand particular motivations to act rea-
sonably, we have little reason to suspect that the convention that undergirds 
our understanding of reasonableness demands it. 
To be clear, this does not mean that we should dispense with the require-
ment that members of a community recognize there is a convention and con-
form to it. For our purposes, a convention should still require that people regu-
larly perform an action in a context where there is widespread acceptance that 
failing to perform the action is a justification for criticism and does not accord 
with people’s preferences.246 These conditions cannot be excised from the test 
because they serve as the justification for punishment under law: the reasoning is 
that because the defendant was a member of that community, they should have 
been aware that her conduct would be a violation of a prevailing convention. 
Returning to the question of what machine operations will be necessary to 
effectuate a Conventionalist Conception of the RPPT, we have boiled it down 
to three steps: the machine must (1) determine the relevant community; (2) 
determine that a majority of actors in that community take the precaution at 
issue; and (3) operate in an environment where a majority of the members of 
that community expect and prefer others to take that precaution as well. 
Thus, a machine will first need a method to determine the borders of the 
relevant community. For humans, this is often obvious, such as when the dis-
pute concerns activities performed exclusively by a certain occupation. But 
other times the lines of demarcation will be blurry. The development of relia-
ble, machine-powered community identification has been a focal point in the 
                                                                                                                           
 244 Tyler Burge, On Knowledge and Convention, 84 PHIL. REV. 249, 252 (1975) (“Parties to a 
convention are frequently confused about the relevant ends (the social functions of their practice); 
they are often brought up achieving them and do not know the origin of their means . . . .”). 
 245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“Negligence is conduct 
which creates an undue risk of harm to others. Contributory negligence is conduct which involves an 
undue risk of harm to the person who sustains it.”); id. at ch.12, topic 4, scope note (“In order that 
either an act or a failure to act may be negligent, the one essential factor is that the actor realizes or 
should realize that the act or the failure to act involves an unreasonable risk of harm to an interest of 
another, which is protected against unintended invasion.”); Mark P. Gergen, Negligent Misrepresenta-
tion as Contract, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 1011 (2013) (“Negligence is agnostic about what makes 
conduct unreasonable.”). 
 246 In this regard, the work of H.L.A. Hart on the conventional basis for the Rule of Recognition 
is helpful. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–95 (2d ed. 1994). 
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field of network science for decades,247 and several techniques have emerged 
that provide useful results. Network science is the study of interactions (links) 
between entities (nodes), and the communities that emerge from their data pro-
cessing are often visualized through clusters of interconnected nodes on a 
graph.248 Scientists have been successful in disentangling overlapping commu-
nities or identifying borderless communities that humans cannot perceive on 
their own.249 In law, scholars have employed these techniques to identify 
communities within the law professoriate.250 
This is not to suggest that automated community detection is already here. 
Important challenges remain: there does not appear to be a scientific consensus 
on the definition of community; network science is at an early stage of devel-
opment in modeling community change; there are limits to scalability with 
more complex real-world systems (and those systems are likely plentiful);251 
and researchers still generally hand-select the variables that they use when 
seeking to identify a network.252 As a consequence, we are still far away from 
an all-purpose, self-contained community detector, despite the fact that net-
work science has made great strides in the last two decades. Importantly, this 
aspect of the Conventionalist Conception, even with future innovations, will 
require data regarding a broad array of activities so that communities can be 
identified. Moreover, further innovation is needed to create reliable community 
                                                                                                                           
 247 See Nacim Fateh Chikhi et al., A New Algorithm for Community Identification in Linked Data, 
in KNOWLEDGE-BASED INTELLIGENT INFORMATION AND ENGINEERING SYSTEMS: KES 12TH INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE PART I, at 641 (Ignac Lovrek et al. eds., 2008) (“Since [the] late nineties, 
identification of web communities has received much attention from researchers.”). 
 248 See FILIPPO MENCZER et al., A FIRST COURSE IN NETWORK SCIENCE 1–4 (2020). 
 249 See, e.g., Till Hoffmann et al., Community Detection in Networks Without Observing Edges, 
SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 22, 2020 (detecting communities with undetectable borders using statistical 
modeling and discussing similar work in climate change, finance, and neuroscience). 
 250 See Daniel Martin Katz et al., Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social Network Analysis of the 
American Law Professoriate, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (2011). 
 251 Anna D. Broido & Aaron Clauset, Scale-Free Networks Are Rare, NATURE COMMC’NS, Mar. 
4, 2019, at 1, 7–8, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-08746-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMZ6-
C8T7] (finding empirical support for rarity of real-world networks that are “scale-free,” meaning that 
they are organized similarly at small scale and at large scale); Petter Holme, Rare and Everywhere: 
Perspectives on Scale-Free Networks, NATURE COMMC’NS, Mar. 4, 2019, at 1, 1–3, https://www.
nature.com/articles/s41467-019-09038-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KQH-NQNB] (commenting on im-
portance on Broido and Clauset’s article and concluding it highlights the debate in network science 
over the definition of “scale-free,” between those who view them as Platonic ideals and those who 
view them as real-world objects).  
 252 See Santo Fortunato, Community Detection in Graphs, 486 PHYSICS REPS. 75, 161 (2010) 
(“Everybody has his/her own idea of what a community is, and most ideas are consistent with each 
other, but, as long as there is still disagreement, it remains impossible to decide which algorithm does 
the best job and there will be no control on the creation of new methods. . . . It means designing prac-
tical examples of graphs with communities, and, in order to do that, one has to agree on the fundamen-
tal concepts of community and partition."). 
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identification in complex environments. Thus, even this first step brings signif-
icant background data and reliability costs. In a parallel to the Average Con-
duct Conception, however, the plaintiff’s theory of duty and causation in the 
case might narrow the realm of possible communities somewhat, thereby light-
ening the load for machines. 
Assuming that a relevant community has been identified, there remain 
two processing tasks under the Conventionalist Conception: identify that a ma-
jority in a relevant population (1) perform the actions in question and (2) ex-
pect and prefer others to do so as well. Because the first is largely the same as 
the Average Conduct Conception, I will focus on the second. 
Unlike assessments discussed under alternative conceptions (e.g., average 
conduct, price, or probability of accident), the determination of expectations, 
preferences, and criticism requires the capacity to gain insight into mental 
states. The scope of conduct covered by ordinary negligence is wide, so this is 
no easy task. 
The law has long presumed that humans have the capacity to determine 
the mental states of others,253 and the primary mode of determination is to in-
terpret the statements of the person examined.254 In the foreseeable future, the 
internet will continue to be the biggest repository of accessible data that evinc-
es community values in the history of mankind. But the vast majority of data 
on the internet is unstructured, meaning data that does not follow a readily in-
terpretable format, such as a column-row database.255 Most of that unstruc-
tured data consists of statements in natural language, items like: emails, text 
files, social media posts, websites, audio files, and video files.256 
                                                                                                                           
 253 Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 999 (1998) 
(“The criminal law frequently hinges liability on subtle distinctions about the actor’s state of mind. 
Was it her purpose? Did she know? Was she reckless? Reliance on these subjective mental states for 
liability assumes that juries can accurately determine what the actor was actually thinking.”). 
 254 Cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST 
FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 438 (2014) (“One central challenge in First Amendment law is the extent 
to which organizations that engage in various speech activities, broadly conceived, should be subject 
to the general law of the land. This is clearly unproblematic in connection with the general rules 
against force and fraud, for which speech acts are used as evidence of intent in such crimes as murder, 
rape, arson, and theft. The legal system could not operate if the external evidence of these mental 
states was systematically excluded from evidence, which of course it is not.”). 
 255 See Bernard Marr, What Is Unstructured Data and Why Is It So Important to Businesses? An 
Easy Explanation for Anyone, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2019/10/16/what-is-unstructured-data-and-why-is-it-so-important-to-businesses-an-easy-explanation-
for-anyone/ [https://perma.cc/Q3HV-5E8G]. 
 256 See id. (listing these items as the most common examples); Dick Weisinger, Unstructured Data: 
Using Analytics to Make Sense of Dark Data’s Secrets, FORMTEK (June 29, 2014), https://formtek.
com/blog/unstructured-data-using-analytics-to-make-sense-of-dark-datas-secrets/ [https://perma.cc/
J98P-BALA] (reporting on Bloomberg Vault’s global head, Harald Collet, as saying, “Eighty percent 
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Identifying collective values in a particular context from internet data will 
require natural language processing. It will be up to AI to determine from that 
unstructured data whether people in the community have taken a critical posi-
tion regarding the conduct in question. Within NLP, the AI technology that is 
likely to be most useful in a Conventionalist Conception is sentiment analysis 
(SA), which seeks to use machines to process natural language in order to de-
termine the emotional state of the author.257 With SA, the machine attempts to 
identify the emotional or attitudinal state of the author of the text under exami-
nation—e.g., that they are pleased with the subject they are talking about, are 
critical, are saddened, etc.258 Although SA is relatively young as a discipline, it 
has made considerable progress.259 
Importantly, its success is determined in part by the degree to which it can 
reliably analyze the semantics and pragmatics of text. In a recent study, a 
group of computer scientists tortured top SA software by making semantic and 
pragmatic manipulations to film reviews, finding them both to be effective, 
especially pragmatic manipulations.260 For example, the scientists changed a 
sentence with positive sentiment, “Unfolds with the creepy elegance and care-
fully calibrated precision of a Dario Argento horror film,” to a sentence of neg-
ative sentiment, “Unfolds with all the creepy elegance and carefully calibrated 
precision of a Jim Carrey comedy film.”261 The programs performed poorly 
under pragmatic and semantic alterations, failing 80% and about 70% of the 
time, respectively; syntactical alterations created failure rates that were slightly 
above 60%.262 
As NLP becomes more semantic and pragmatic, sentiment analysis per-
formance will improve. In recent years, state-of-the-art sentiment analysis has 
relied upon machine-learned algorithms.263 When reinforced with examples of 
ground truth sentiment at the individual level, we can expect a machine-
learning-powered algorithm at least to guess sentiment correctly more often 
                                                                                                                           
of [unstructured] data is generated by humans in the form of documents, emails, and recorded phone 
calls and is typically harder for employees to manage” (alteration in original)). 
 257 See BING LIU, SENTIMENT ANALYSIS: MINING OPINIONS, SENTIMENTS, AND EMOTIONS 1 
(2015). 
 258 Id. In this paper, I do not distinguish between Sentiment Analysis and Emotion Analysis. 
 259 Michael A. Livermore et al., Computationally Assisted Regulatory Participation, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 977, 1004–05 (2018) (discussing the progress of sentiment analysis). 
 260 Taylor Mahler et al., Breaking NLP: Using Morphosyntax, Semantics, Pragmatics and World 
Knowledge to Fool Sentiment Analysis Systems, in ASS’N FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORKSHOP ON BUILDING LINGUISTICALLY GENERALIZABLE NLP SYSTEMS 
33–39 (2017), https://aclanthology.org/W17-54.pdf [https://perma.cc/L65L-X3HR]. 
 261 Id. at 36. 
 262 Id. at 37–38 & fig.5. 
 263 See Shervin Minaee et al., Deep-Sentiment: Sentiment Analysis Using Ensemble of CNN and 
Bi-LSTM Models, CORR (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.04206.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A84-RZM2]. 
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over time.264 Of course, identifying the sentiment of an author is a different 
task than determining the collective sentiment of a population regarding a cat-
egory of action. Needless to say, the degree of handcrafting required to create 
and, especially, to maintain the system will cut into its utility. 
One saving grace for pragmatic advancement could be the rapidly ex-
panding collection of data regarding the non-verbal aspects of context, which 
improve the reliability of interpretations of the statements made in that context 
and, additionally, increase access to mental states.265 Facial expressions, skin 
conductivity, temperature, heart rate, blood pressure, location, and other physi-
ological measures tend to increase the accuracy of our determinations of men-
tal states.266 As the Internet of Things rapidly expands, more physiological in-
formation is placed onto the internet and might eventually be accessed by the 
machine-learning-powered NLP programs.267 
Lastly, even our soft-Lewis approach could suffer from gaps in which no 
convention has arisen. As with other approaches, closure rules, such as placing 
the burden on the plaintiff to identify a sufficiently reliable convention, offer a 
sort of fix, but overreliance on closure rules could lead to unjust or unpopular 
results.268 Of course, it is possible, that human juries will arrive at unjust or 
unfair results when deciding under similar circumstances, and it is difficult to 
know at this point in time whether machines will surpass human performance 
in this regard. 
All of this is to say that if technology continues on its current trajectory 
and courts are granted access to sufficient data, then it is theoretically possible 
that an automated Conventionalist Conception of the RPPT could develop and 
lead to satisfactory outcomes. Legislators would have to wait a long time269 
before the prospect of funding such a project would be appealing, and even 
then, it will be colossally expensive to gain sufficient background data and to 
develop reliable processing techniques. Compared to the rival conceptions we 
have already discussed, this approach not only requires assessments of con-
formity that are similar to (and just as costly as) the Average Conduct Concep-
                                                                                                                           
 264 See id. (stating that vast amount of labeled data has helped bring deep-learning models used 
for sentiment analysis to state-of-the-art levels). 
 265 See, e.g., Lin Shu et al., A Review of Emotion Recognition Using Physiological Signals, SEN-
SORS, June 28, 2018, at 1, 33. 
 266 See id. 
 267 See V. Jagadeeswari et al., A Study on Medical Internet of Things and Big Data in Personal-
ized Healthcare System, HEALTH INFO. SCI. & SYS., Dec. 2018, at 1, 1 (2018). To be clear, I’m not 
suggesting that this is a good thing! 
 268 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2033 (2007) (“Of 
equal importance, conventionalist accounts do not adequately explain the central role of the prototype 
of the reasonably prudent person, and they do not explain how the reasonably prudent person standard 
can function if community convention does not offer any decisive answer.”). 
 269 See Cambria & White, supra note 76, at 51. 
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tion, but it additionally requires complex community identification and NLP 
techniques that are not currently reliable enough to do the job. 
2. Compatibility 
Kelley and Wendt have persuasively argued that the Conventionalist Con-
ception is the interpretive framework of the RPPT most supported by model 
jury instructions across the country: 
The instructions seem to call on the jury to determine whether the 
defendant’s conduct, which resulted in harm to the plaintiff, was a 
private injustice to the plaintiff. So it is only in relation to the com-
munity’s standard of what conduct the defendant owed to the plain-
tiff under the circumstances of the case that the jury is called on to 
make a community moral judgment. That judgment is not a free-
floating moral judgment, but a precise determination of whether, in 
light of the community’s preexisting coordination patterns, the 
plaintiff could reasonably have expected the defendant to have acted 
differently in order to protect the plaintiff from harm . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . The language points the jury to preexisting standards of con-
duct that the plaintiff could reasonably expect from the defendant 
. . . . The most persuasive explanation of the negligence standard, 
and the jury’s role in applying that standard, identifies the source of 
that preexisting standard in the safety conventions of the community 
and the associated expectations of the plaintiff.270 
There is also evidence that this conception is a fair characterization of how 
jurors behave. Feigenson’s field research yielded the finding that jurors have a 
tendency to rely upon cultural norms in assessing defendant behavior.271 Ste-
ven Hetcher’s analysis of the empirical literature led him to conclude “that 
there is good reason to suppose that juries do not engage in Hand Test norma-
tive processing, but instead draw from their diverse array of everyday norms 
and customs when providing concrete substance to the abstract reasonable per-
son standard to render a decision on the issue of negligence.”272 Tobia, in in-
terpreting the results of his experimental studies, offered the possibility that 
reasonableness determinations might differ from ideal or average judgments in 
part because of the role that community values play in assessments of statisti-
                                                                                                                           
 270 Kelley & Wendt, supra note 135, at 621–22. 
 271 FEIGENSON, supra note 173, at 165 (“Thus, the jurors’ decision reflects a confluence of vari-
ous cultural norms but a common pattern of inferring blame from the transgression of those norms.”). 
 272 Hetcher, supra note 208, at 646–47. 
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cally common behavior.273 Jaeger echoes this sentiment. After his experiments 
provided conflicting evidence regarding whether data showing aspirational 
conduct or data showing average conduct were more relevant to layperson de-
terminations, Jaeger concluded, “Legal scholars have sometimes been critical 
of the idea that the reasonable person standard is informed by observations and 
beliefs about what other people would do” but “[m]y findings indicated that 
lay participants put more weight on information about community customs 
than many tort theorists would expect and much less weight on cost-
justification than many tort theorists would expect.”274 Recall that a Lewisian-
AI determination of conventions could capture what he calls the “hybrid view” 
of reasonableness: it involves an assessment of both statistical frequency and 
shared standards of criticism.275 
Still, none of these authors would go so far as to say that the Convention-
alist Conception is the only permissible way to understand the RPPT from an 
internal or external point of view. In other words, although it receives the most 
support, it would be wrong to suggest that other conceptions are non-starters. 
It could be the breadth and flexibility accorded to RPPT interpreters in a 
Conventionalist Conception that makes it most consistent with existing law 
and practice. It doesn’t rule much out. Functionally, the standard comports 
with the wide-ranging approach to determining liability that many jurors ap-
pear to take.276 It would be unwise to assume, however, that variety in juror 
conduct alone indicates that they are cognitively following a conventionalist 
interpretation of RPPT. In other words, the mere fact that jurors do not appear 
to be following a single, mechanical approach to the RPPT does not entail that 
conventionalism is the winner. 
There are at least two more problems that could be exacerbated with an 
AI-powered Conventionalist Conception RPPT. First, conventions might be at 
odds with notions of legality or morality: racism, sexism, homophobia, and 
other disgusting notions are not categorically out of bounds with the Conven-
tionalist Conception, even if they are ruled out under substantive law.277 Sec-
ond, as discussed, algorithm-powered AI has the capacity to mask biases, mak-
ing them all the more pernicious.278 
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Summing up, the Conventionalist Conception is more costly than both the 
Average Conduct Conception and the Hand Test with regard to background 
data and reliability, but it is the most compatible with existing law. 
D. Moral Approaches 
Yet another candidate for the RPPT are Moral Conceptions. On this ac-
count, the RPPT directs jurors to engage in some form of moral reasoning.279 
Seminal American torts theorist, Francis Bohlen, after dismissing the Av-
erage Conduct Conception, captured the spirit of morality-driven interpreta-
tions of the RPPT: 
[The reasonable man] is an ideal creature, expressing public opinion 
declared by its accredited spokesman, whether court or jury, as to 
what ought to be due under the circumstances by a man who is not so 
engrossed in his own affairs as to disregard the effect of his conduct 
upon the interests of others. He may be called a personification of the 
court or jury’s social judgment. The factor controlling the judgment of 
the defendant’s conduct is not what is, but what ought to be.280  
Thus, under a Moral Approach Conception the RPPT is an instance in which 
moral principles⸺whether they are principles culled from notions of equali-
ty,281 corrective justice,282 virtue ethics,283 or some other similar domain⸺have 
been incorporated into the law,284 operating as a demand that those who apply 
it engage in a moral evaluation of the instant case. Moral Conceptions have 
some appeal, at least compared to the other conceptions I have discussed, be-
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cause they operate as a check on certain forms of evil, insofar as that can be 
widely acknowledged. 
1. Background Data and Reliability 
The Moral Approach Conception is the most computationally demanding 
test we have discussed. There are those who believe that a moral reasoning 
machine is impossible or unforeseeably distant because moral reasoning is in-
extricably linked to features that we associate with humans or other living 
creatures.285 This is not unreasonable; as there is support for the positions that 
our moral reasoning is intertwined with our consciousness and emotions286 and 
that technologists will struggle to imbue machines with those features or their 
functional equivalents.287 These arguments are not so convincing, however, 
that we should stop our analysis here, particularly because it is not the case that 
all Moral Approach Conceptions assert that consciousness and emotion are 
necessary conditions. Besides, a small number of people believe that AI might 
have already achieved consciousness!288 
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It will be helpful to start with programs that are already in existence. Sev-
eral computer scientists and philosophers have offered computerized ap-
proaches to moral decision-making.289 The most complete and transparent ap-
proaches offer hand-crafted rules or algorithms for narrow situations. For ex-
ample, Derek Leben offered a programmable algorithm based on the moral 
reasoning of philosopher John Rawls for autonomous vehicles that face trolley 
problem situations.290 Whether the algorithms that result from these efforts 
truly embody the complexity of the philosophy from which they arose can be 
questioned,291 but there is a more obvious shortcoming for our purposes. Gen-
erally speaking, closed-system approaches like static algorithms can produce 
satisfactory results only in narrow circumstances.292 
From a background data standpoint, fixed codifications of moral reason-
ing are inexpensive (assuming that the codified moral approach was readily 
knowable), making background data costs low. But these success stories are 
likely to be rare. It is uncontroversial to assert that moral disagreement is 
widespread,293 so there is reason to believe that any satisfactory handcrafted 
approach will have a rather narrow scope of application. Such approaches are, 
therefore, not reliable enough to be used in the RPPT context, given its 
breadth. What might be needed is something closer to a multi-purpose moral 
deliberator. 
Although machine-learning could theoretically offer a solution, efforts 
thus far have not yielded reliable results. Techno-optimistic ethicists Wendell 
Wallach and Colin Allen discussed its viability in connection with developing 
a virtue ethics-based program: 
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It is interesting and suggestive to note the similarity between Aristo-
telian ethics and [neural network machine learning], and the possi-
bility that character might emerge from a [neural network] of how 
the brain works. Given that virtues are context-sensitive, the power 
of [neural network machine learning] to unite virtue theory and par-
ticularism is attractive. However, existing [neural network] systems 
are a long way from tackling the kind of complex learning tasks one 
associates with moral development. The challenge of implementing 
virtues within a neural network remains a formidable one.294 
The scope of the injuries that fall under the umbrella of ordinary negligence is 
so large295 that handcrafting is unlikely to yield a scalable tool. 
Even if there exist moral imperatives that naturally structure into pro-
grammable rules, those approaches might not correspond to the approach de-
manded under the Moral Conception of the RPPT. Because there is no single 
moral approach to the RPPT or account of moral reasoning that emerges as the 
consensus pick among legal theoreticians,296 let alone among judges or jurors, 
I will consider the leading alternatives. 
It is somewhat popular for legal theorists to conceive of moral reasoning 
as an originative act in which reasoners rely on creativity or imagination to 
select and balance multiple values in arriving at a result.297 Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr. offers a vivid account: 
Much practical moral reasoning requires a kind of instinctive, fre-
quently unconscious sizing up of the facts of a situation, including 
others’ psychological states and their likely perception of particular 
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acts or gestures as kind, supportive, funny, creative, insightful, and 
so forth. In my experience, there are many non-philosophers whose 
lives exhibit shining moral excellence, not because they are pro-
found conceptual reasoners, but because of their capacities to make 
insightful and sometimes imaginative psychological and empirical 
judgments about the effects of possible actions and about ways to 
transform moments or lives for the better. They perceive possibilities, 
and means for realizing those possibilities, that others—sometimes 
including first-rate philosophers—do not.298 
The notion that moral reasoning is imaginative, occasionally unconscious, and 
insightful is in line with the modern philosophical trends that reject rule-driven 
conceptions in favor of particularist, contextual ones. As philosopher Catrin 
Misslehorn explains: 
Understanding morality as a kind of calculus was quite popular in 
the history of moral philosophy. . . . Yet, there has been more recently 
a trend towards challenging this way of thinking. The opponents of 
this view have a radically different picture of the human mind and 
morality. Dyed-in-the-wool particularists believe that human morality 
cannot be captured by a set of rules, however rough they may be.299  
Misselhorn notes that this conception is abhorrent to existing methods of com-
putation: “Such an extremely context-sensitive capacity is very hard to imple-
ment in an artificial system, even with the help of a bottom-up approach [such 
as those that derive morality from patterns in data or upon models that mimic 
evolution].”300 The more responsive to context a program needs to be, the more 
data it needs in order to identify reliable context-specific algorithms. And even 
if that were possible, it would be difficult to confirm that the algorithms mimic 
the moral reasoning process demanded by the RPPT, as opposed to following 
an inscrutable, counter-intuitive process-based statistical correlation.301 
A less artistic version of the moral reasoning process simply demands that 
the interpreter act as a moral agent.302 This requires some degree of autonomy 
in deciding right and wrong, as well as acting upon reasons that justify those 
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decisions according to the decider.303 In the legal context, some scholars have 
described jurors as moral agents.304 
Faster processing and increased access to relevant background data are, 
on their own, unlikely to give rise to a machine that can engage in moral rea-
soning, so understood.305 This generation of AI is good at following a set pro-
gram, but it is not yet capable of using a rich and versatile method to identify 
moral conduct or to choose among various ethical approaches. In short, it 
struggles to be autonomous. Machine learning is, at its basic core, a statistical 
approach that assesses progress based on how well the program increases pre-
dictive power or other maximization goals; it ordinarily gets better as it gets 
more feedback data and further adjusts its statistical approach.306 We have a long 
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way to go before a system can reliably escape the strictures of its initial goal and 
turn back on itself, changing its own fundamental project as it learns more about 
human goals or values even though they were not pre-programmed.307 We might 
be farther still from a machine acting autonomously and reflecting upon or 
seeking to justify a moral position with reasons.308 
A promising technique in this regard is inverse reinforcement-learning 
(IRL), in which a computer is programmed to observe conduct and help delin-
eate or infer its hidden values or goals.309 This is distinct from traditional rein-
forcement learning, in which the goal is posited and learning is in service of 
furthering that goal.310 We should not expect this technique to lead to complex 
realizations of social goods anytime soon, however.311 And machine learning 
has thus far made more progress when operating for a pre-programmed goal 
than when operating to learn new goals and self-revise.312 But like other spe-
cies of machine learning, IRL’s performance is contingent upon access to copi-
ous amounts of relevant and exploitable data of human moral decision-making, 
making it expensive from a background data standpoint.313 
Yet another approach under the Moral Approach umbrella are rights-
based theories. Benjamin Zipursky, describing commonalities among rights-
based theorists such as Gregory Keating, Arthur Ripstein, Ernest Weinrib, and 
to some extent himself, explained that “individuals are entitled, as a matter of 
political morality, to a substantial level of respect and vigilance for their physi-
cal integrity—as well as their property.”314 At first glance, these rights-based 
theories appear not to emphasize the moral character of jury deliberation, 
which, if true, would make them friendlier to the mechanical approaches at 
which machines excel. Indeed, Zipursky concedes that it bears a superficial 
resemblance to the Hand Test “because it accommodates both the need for ac-
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tion and the need to be free of harm.”315 But he goes on to explain that, when 
properly understood, it defies simple formulation “because it does not aggre-
gate well-being.”316 In other words, jurors must set the line for liability be-
tween the right not to be physically injured and the right not to be unduly re-
stricted in action; but this is not operationalizable as a formula. 
Although it is possible to handcraft programs with rules of defeasibility 
that might resolve conflicts between rules,317 it is difficult to see how one 
might encode the borderlines of the competing rights without some way to 
weight or otherwise quantify those values. I cannot rule out the possibility that 
a model that is friendly to if-then structures could be derived; yet it is some-
what clearer that such a technique is unlikely to be reliable in the wide variety 
of contexts that courts ordinarily encounter. 
Despite the differences in the Moral Approaches discussed here, they are 
all quite expensive, requiring either a paradigm shift in computing or, more 
modestly, far-off innovations in machine-learning or other artificial intelli-
gence techniques. In short, this is the most expensive approach from the stand-
point of background data and reliability. 
2. Compatibility 
Turning to legal compatibility, it should be obvious from the variety of 
approaches already discussed that Moral Approach Conceptions are popular 
among academics. They do not find much support in the instructions provided 
to jurors, however. 
Although the RPPT uses evaluative language, it does not command, in the 
content of the standard itself, that jurors make their own moral judgment; ra-
ther, the typical instruction directs them to consult a reasonable person stand-
ard. Kelley and Wendt describe it thusly: 
Each of the recurring critically important phrases in these pattern in-
structions, ordinary care and the conduct of a reasonably prudent or 
a reasonably careful person, seem to refer to a preexisting standard. 
That standard does not seem to be so much a moral as a social 
standard, based on the actual conduct of one who exercises ordinary 
care for the safety of others. This social, rather than moral, nature 
can be seen, as well, by focusing on what these instructions do not 
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contain. There is no mention of fault, improper conduct, excuses, 
good or bad, right or wrong.318 
Perhaps this is unsurprising. As the analysis thus far has shown, scholarly 
Moral Approach Conceptions exhibit a high degree of variation, and it is rea-
sonable to surmise that this diversity of opinion would not have arisen had the 
courts directed jurors to engage in a particular type of moral reasoning.319 
Insofar as we want a machine that emulates what human jurors actually 
do, there is empirical evidence that jurors engage in moral reasoning during 
deliberation. Just as Feigenson’s research supports Conventionalist approaches 
by providing evidence that cultural norms are a factor in juror assessments of 
liability, it additionally supports the Moral Approach by providing evidence 
that “jurors [also] thought about responsibility in a personalized and moralized 
way.”320 Likewise, in two experiments, psychologists John Bernard, Robert 
Cohen and Michael Lupfer observed that juries composed of people with high-
er-level moral reasoning acquitted a defendant although mixed juries or juries 
composed of people with low-level moral reasoning hung.321 These results are 
similar to those in an experiment performed by psychologists Ken Rotenberg, 
Maureen Hewlett, and Catherine Siegwart, in which they found that people with 
higher-level moral reasoning were more influential in jury deliberation.322 There 
is little evidence that jurors engage in one of the detailed, scholarly accounts de-
scribed above, but it is probable that jurors frequently tap into their senses of 
right and wrong and that doing so materially affects case outcomes. In other 
words, there is evidence that jurors act as moral agents. 
This is not surprising. Theorists have suggested that the RPPT passes the 
buck, leaving the juror to rely on their own personal sense of right and 
wrong.323 But that is a far cry from the RPPT constituting an authoritative legal 
dictate to use a moral approach, even if it is statistically likely that jurors will 
use the RPPT to engage their senses of right and wrong as a factual matter. 
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The question here is whether a Moral Approach is a bigger deviation from 
existing law than its rival conceptions. The above analysis supports the conclu-
sion that a legislator would face greater resistance in pushing for a Moral Ap-
proach than for a Conventionalist Conception, all other things being equal. 
In sum, the Moral Approach is a poor performer in almost all dimensions. 
Its demands are likely beyond existing technology, leaving us to guess how fu-
ture technology might deal with background data availability or reliability. Fur-
thermore, it does not receive strong support in American jury instructions. There 
is evidence, however, that juror deliberation is significantly normative and to 
some extent, driven by a juror’s personal sense of morality, as a de facto matter. 
E. The Deflationary Conception 
Having read the analysis thus far, one could not be blamed for wondering 
whether the existence of rival conceptions is evidence of a deeper truth: there 
just isn’t a significant, legally dictated RPPT conception to be found. Although 
Conventionalism is most consistent with jury instructions, that is but one way 
to understand the meaning of the RPPT. Scholars have arrived at different con-
ceptions after analyzing appellate decisions,324 relying on political theory,325 or 
using other methodologies.326 To quote Gertrude Stein, maybe there really is 
“no there there.”327 Perhaps juries, finding little guidance, are engaging in un-
moored, will-o-the-wisp decision-making. Their conduct might appear to be 
dictated by legal principles, but maybe it is really a byproduct of some combi-
nation of influences that does not comport with any of our law-grounded con-
ceptions thus far. 
I call this the “Deflationary Conception.” Despite being something of an 
anti-conception, it might nevertheless offer a computerizable approach, one 
through which predictions of legal and factual determinations are reliable 
enough to meet our expectations of legality regardless of the way in which 
those determinations are made. Proponents of this approach would care about 
the meaning of the RPPT only insofar as it is necessary to predict how jurors 
actually decide cases under the standard. 
The closest analogue to this view is the so-called “Prediction Theory of 
Law,” which eschews grand theorizing about legal guidance from an internal 
                                                                                                                           
 324 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: 
A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683, 708 (2002). 
 325 See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1862–80 (2004) (using a Rawlsian conception of fairness to interpret 
reasonableness in negligence and strict liability). 
 326 See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Balancing in English Negligence 
Law, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 489, 501–04 (2002) (looking at English tort law). 
 327 GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937). 
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point of view.328 Holmes is credited with Prediction Theory. And although he 
might have espoused a different view of the RPPT in other areas of his writing, 
he took a broadly deflationary approach in The Path of the Law: 
The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and 
negligence, and so forth, and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more 
common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral 
sense, at some state of the argument, and so to drop into fallacy.329 
Instead, he argues, we would benefit by taking a positivistic stance and con-
ceiving of the law as a prediction of how courts behave.330 
This prediction theory is not specifically about the RPPT, but the breach 
standard is a fair target: thereunder, one could dismiss the notion that the con-
tent of the law is a specific call to community, economic, moral, or mathemati-
cal principle and assert, instead, that its meaning has no importance beyond 
assisting us in predicting what jurors or courts will do under the circumstances 
of a case. 
1. Background Data and Reliability 
Statistically-grounded predictions are AI’s forte. Since at least Segal and 
Spaeth’s first major work,331 there has grown an impressive empirical literature 
regarding improved methods for predicting case outcomes, many of which use 
rather limited data but yield results that beat human experts.332 Harnessing su-
pervised machine learning techniques has ratcheted predictions even higher.333 
Currently, state-of-the-art methods incorporate reliable scores assigned to the 
                                                                                                                           
 328 See Michael S. Green, Prediction Theories of Law and the Internal Point of View, 51 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 921, 922–23 (2014) (“Under prediction theories, not only is the internal point of view 
not necessary for law, internal legal statements are morally suspect.”). 
 329 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW 8 (Floating Press ed. 2009) (1897). 
 330 Id. at 9 (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are 
what I mean by the law.”). By “positivistic,” I mean only that Holmes is viewing law as a social fact. I 
do not mean to suggest that Prediction Theory is emblematic of legal positivism. To the contrary, 
many legal positivists reject Prediction Theory insofar as it is taken to be constitutive of the concept of 
law. See, e.g., HART, supra note 246, at 91. 
 331 See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AT-
TITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (using statistical methods to improve prediction of Supreme Court cases). 
 332 See Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative History: Empirical 
Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making, 38 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 419, 420–21 (2009) (summarizing major additions to the predictive model). 
 333 See Daniel Martin Katz et al., A General Approach for Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 4 (Apr. 12, 2017), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?
id=10.1371/journal.pone.0174698 [https://perma.cc/L9JW-RSYN] (using random forests learning in a 
supervised context and improving on the general level of prediction demonstrated by prior work but 
with the power of being applied out-of-sample to the entire past and future of the Court, not a single 
term). 
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facts of previous cases, judges, and other relevant details, which are used to 
train the machine under human supervision with the help of machine-learning 
programs.334 For over a decade, technologists have been keen to develop 
methods for predicting damages awards and settlement amounts in negligence 
cases; Lex Machina, a legal analytics company, claims, “With this data, for the 
first time, lawyers can predict the behaviors and outcomes that different legal 
strategies will produce.”335 And there is an emerging cottage industry of (argu-
ably disturbing)336 software that scrapes the internet or other sources to set 
prices for settlement or provide data about potential individual jurors regarding 
biases, strengths, and risks.337 
A project of this nature is reliant on a massive amount of data regarding 
the circumstances that bear upon jury decision-making. Because it limits its 
focus to jurors, however, the universe of relevant data is potentially a lot 
smaller than what would be necessary for the construction of a versatile moral 
deliberator, convention finder, cost-benefit analyzer, or average assessor. 
Moreover, that universe has a finite limit because, when the process of auto-
mating the RPPT is complete, there will no longer be new jury determinations 
to review. 
Although background data costs might be lower under the Deflationary 
Conception than under its rivals, it is an open question whether jurors exhibit 
patterned enough behavior when subjected to the demands of the RPPT to 
yield strong and reliable predictions of juror behavior. If so, then the Defla-
tionary path to automation might be comparatively short. If not, the Deflation-
ary project might be doomed. Even under the former scenario, however, there 
is the risk that performance will worsen over time. 
This requires a bit of explanation. A good starting place is to imagine how 
the Deflationary Conception would operate if it were to reach its theoretical 
upper bound. Under this thought experiment: imagine that scientists, using 
similar techniques to those in existence today, develop an algorithm that pre-
dicts breach determinations under the RPPT with near one hundred percent 
accuracy. Suppose further that rather than predicting outcomes, courts begin to 
                                                                                                                           
 334 The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. L., http://scdb.wustl.edu/ [https://perma.cc/SH35-
ECUD]. 
 335 About Us: What We Do, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/
QAV9-R4NU]. 
 336 Todd Feathers, This Company Is Using Racially-Biased Algorithms to Select Jurors, VICE 
(Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/epgmbw/this-company-is-using-racially-biased-
algorithms-to-select-jurors [https://perma.cc/Q6K7-4YU7] (“Momus Analytics’ predictive scoring 
system is using race to grade potential jurors on vague qualities like ‘leadership’ and ‘personal re-
sponsibility.’”). 
 337 See, e.g., MOMUS ANALYTICS, https://momusanalytics.com/ [https://perma.cc/VS6T-NQJR]; 
VOLTAIRE, https://voltaireapp.com/ [https://perma.cc/7TXN-JLGN]. 
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use it to decide all new negligence cases. Under those circumstances, the court 
could be reasonably confident that the algorithm is reaching the same out-
comes that human jurors would have reached had they been given the chance. 
At least initially. 
The world is constantly changing, but the machine’s predictions rely upon 
old data regarding the way that dynamic outside-of-the-jury-box factors impact 
the semi-random assembly of people who actually sat within the jury box. Re-
placing jurors with machines would make it impossible to capture post-
automation data of juror responses to new, post-automation circumstances. 
Over time, its absence would likely diminish the predictive power of the ma-
chine, so long as the machine seeks to predict how new jurors at that point in 
time would respond to the circumstances of a case. Following the old trope 
about judges,338 it might be the case that juror RPPT decisions are influenced 
by what a juror ate for breakfast. The development of a new breakfast cereal 
might have a novel impact on jury decision-making, but the machine would 
struggle to discover that connection when no data about jurors who had eaten it 
exist. The machine could simulate jurors, but its prediction would have to be 
based on prior juror behavior and the behavior of non-jurors. 
Of course, this is just an intuition pump. It is unlikely that we will be able 
to predict juror behavior with that level of accuracy in the foreseeable future (if 
ever), but the dynamic is the same. Suppose that we can someday predict juror 
behavior at lower, but satisfactory, levels of accuracy. Even then, the accuracy 
of prediction will drop over time if jurors are displaced by machines, leading 
to increasing reliability problems. 
Perhaps that weakness does not matter to Deflationists. If the content of 
the law does not guide the juror, why should we quibble over what new jurors 
would do? If the way jurors have actually behaved before automation was an 
incomprehensible mix of factors gathered from past decades of data, then why 
would a different incomprehensible mix gathered from current data better meet 
the demands of a rule of law, welfarism, or some other public value? These are 
not easy questions to answer, especially if we presume that the decision to au-
tomate the RPPT has already been made. After all, a significant number of 
people insist that we interpret our Constitution using the murky, collective un-
derstanding of people who lived more than two centuries ago.339 
                                                                                                                           
 338 See generally Dan Priel, Law Is What the Judge Had for Breakfast: A Brief History of an Un-
palatable Idea, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 899 (2020). 
 339 See, e.g., Neil M. Gorsuch, Why Originalism Is the Best Approach to the Constitution, TIME 
(Sept. 6, 2019), https://time.com/5670400/justice-neil-gorsuch-why-originalism-is-the-best-approach-to-
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know the original understanding because the document’s too old and cryptic. Hardly. We figure out 
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We have thus far been focused on the problem of waning reliability, but 
there is the other side of the coin to consider: fixing the data to a particular pe-
riod of history would lower background data costs over time. Without new data 
to consider, there would be little need to make significant background data ex-
penditures once automation took place. It would vastly limit the amount of 
data necessary and would limit collection costs to the period before it launches. 
Compared to other conceptions, then, the realm of relevant background 
data is very likely smaller than it would be under Conventionalist or Moral 
Conceptions, and, over time, it could be dwarfed by Average Conduct Concep-
tion or the Hand Test. 
2. Compatibility 
Little need be said about the profound incompatibility of the Deflationary 
Conception. No jury instructions take this approach. How could they? Juries 
do not engage in the absurdity of deciding based solely upon the best predic-
tion of how they would decide. 
The Prediction Theory is a one-size-fits-all approach to legality. It does 
not matter whether the most determinative factor is the text of the RPPT or 
something outside of the courtroom, or whether jurors are conscious of its in-
fluence or not. The only concern is predictive power. For example, the Defla-
tionary Conception could lead to the bizarre conclusion that femininity of a 
male voice is, to some extent, built into the law of Supreme Court cases be-
cause, according to a recent study, male advocates were more likely to win Su-
preme Court cases when they are perceived as less masculine based on a 
speech sample of less than three seconds.340 Needless to say, no jury instruc-
tions take this approach. Moreover, it is a conception that will not likely appeal 
to legislators because it gives no privileged place to the content of their laws. 
The Deflationary Conception is political kryptonite. It has the highest 
compatibility costs of any approach discussed thus far. 
To summarize, the Deflationary Account is the nuclear option, one that 
might shift the finish line closer to existing machine performance levels (due 
to high marks on both processing and background data) and make automation 
more feasible, but at the expense of dearly held notions of legality. Presuma-
bly, legislators are among the population of the legally faithful. 
                                                                                                                           
the original meaning of old and difficult texts all the time. Just ask any English professor who teaches 
Shakespeare or Beowulf.”). 
 340 Daniel Chen et al., Perceived Masculinity Predicts U.S. Supreme Court Outcomes, 11 PLOS 
ONE 1, 10 (Oct. 13, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0164324 
[https://perma.cc/R9AJ-K999]. 
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F. Comparing the Alternatives 
The foregoing analysis has revealed no clear winner for the legislator 
looking to maximize both technological feasibility and legal compatibility; 
some tests present fewer costs with respect to background data and reliability, 
but these approaches do not perform as well on compatibility. 
The Deflationary and Average Conduct Conceptions are technologically 
attractive, but they are at the outer limits of legal compatibility. The former is 
founded on assumptions that are hostile to the widely accepted notion that ju-
rors accept the RPPT as a legitimate standard for guiding their decision-
making on breach. Moreover, the Average Conduct Conception fails to capture 
the fact that the RPPT invokes a more robust standard than numerical com-
monness. The Hand Test is a middling performer on most scores, but it is 
worse on compatibility than Conventionalist Conceptions and, as a matter of 
actual practice, the Moral Approach Conception. For its part, the Convention-
alist Conception does best on permissibility but poorly on background data. 
Finally, the Moral Conception does quite poorly on technology scores and is 
not particularly impressive on compatibility. 
Figure 1 shows a simplified version of their relationships to each other. 
Although it does not indicate the degree of separation between them, my hope 
is that it can serve as a useful rule of thumb. The asterisk marks the deep un-
certainty regarding whether the Deflationary Conception can achieve or main-
tain reliability. 
Figure 1: Simplified Ranking of RPPT Conceptions Along Technological and Legal Lines 
(1 is the top ranking) 
 Average L. Hand Convention Moral Deflation 
Background Data 2 3 4 5 1 
Reliability 3 2 4 5 1* 
Compatibility 4 3 1 2 5 
 
Without a decisive winner in all categories, we are left to wonder whether leg-
islators will be willing to accept the tradeoffs in adopting a cheaper, computer-
friendly conception of the RPPT; whether they would be willing to wait for 
technological innovation that makes possible the automation of more legally 
compatible conceptions; or whether they will just sit the whole thing out. 
The legislators who seek automation and for whom compatibility is a 
secondary concern will likely be most attracted to the Hand Test, and to a less-
er extent the Average Conduct Conception, for the foreseeable future. Although 
the feasibility of creating satisfactory automated versions of those tests within 
that period is by no means clear, the data that it relies upon is commonly 
tracked in the automotive, insurance, and retail industries. Where there are 
gaps, the Hand Test is more reliable than the Average Conduct Conception. 
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As time goes on, however, automation of the Conventionalist Conception 
could become more appealing, particularly to those who value compatibility. 
Background data costs are likely to fall as trackers get more ubiquitous, stor-
age gets cheaper, and data retrieval gets faster. The data will get better, it will get 
more plentiful, and it will get easier to process. The Hand Test and Convention-
alist approaches will be clear beneficiaries as they presently face high back-
ground data costs and are most likely to use AI techniques that harness big data. 
As background data costs fall, so too might reliability costs. Some of the 
techniques we have described become more reliable as they receive more or 
better data. For example, programs that seek to identify patterns in order to 
derive a function for RPPT compliance have weaker reliability if they lack 
enough data to identify correlations of high significance. All of the approaches 
highlighted here other than, perhaps, the deep AI versions of the Moral Ap-
proach are primarily based on techniques of that sort. As the gap of technolog-
ical feasibility between those approaches shrinks, the Conventionalist Concep-
tion’s advantage on compatibility is more likely to be determinative. Contrari-
wise, this dynamic suggests that those super-advanced Moral Approaches 
could be disfavored for a long period of technological development. All of this 
assumes, of course, that the law of breach does not significantly change in fa-
vor of a particular conception in the interim. 
III. STRUCTURAL VALUES OF THE REASONABLY PRUDENT PERSON TEST 
AND THE FIXED COSTS OF AUTOMATION 
Thus far, the analysis has been framed by conceptions of the legal mean-
ing of the RPPT. This was a sensible framework because an important part of 
legislation is considering how following the content of a norm, like the RPPT, 
will change the conduct of those subject to it, making a desired state of affairs 
more likely to occur. Lawmakers will have to settle on a conception of that 
content before they can decide how to automate it. It turns out that automation 
presents a tradeoff between computer-friendliness and complex, values-
centered interpretation. In other words, analysis of the RPPT automation re-
veals a menu of incommensurate, imperfect compromises as stakeholders ne-
gotiate the dynamics of variable legislative cost. But what about fixed cost? Is 
there anything that would be lost or hurt by automation regardless of the con-
ception of the RPPT legislators choose? The analysis below will reveal two: 
participatory and deliberative democracy. To get there, however, it will first 
discuss the surprising degree of freedom that jurors enjoy when they make 
breach determinations under the existing system. 
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A. The Puzzling Outcome-Centric Approach 
One of the fascinating things about the breach determination for ordinary 
negligence is that it is the legislative hot potato of modern American civil law. 
The RPPT is a pivotal determination in a massive number of cases: it is 
the one aspect of the tort case for ordinary negligence that determines whether 
the defendant committed a wrong, and ordinary negligence is the most com-
monly raised tort claim.341 It is a meaningful and frequent opportunity to con-
trol the coercive power of the state to redress carelessly caused injuries. One 
might guess that lawmakers or other stakeholders would relish the opportunity 
to structure the resolution of so many tort claims, and the apportionment of so 
much money. 
But that guess would be wrong. State legislatures have largely avoided 
supplementing or tinkering with the RPPT.342 Judges have largely followed 
suit, saying very little about how to apply it in their jury instructions.343 Judges 
in several states give model instructions that are designed to resist the notion of 
adding flesh to the RPPT skeleton, saying language like “the law does not say 
how the negligence standard applies, rather that it is for the jury to decide, 
based upon the facts in the case.”344 
Even when the judges are forced to face the hot potato through pre-trial 
motions or appeal, they have imposed standards that functionally keep the de-
ciding power in the hands of the juror. For example, during summary judgment 
on the question of breach, courts set the bar high, giving it to the jury unless 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”345 And once the jury has decided, the court 
                                                                                                                           
 341 Young v. Brown, 658 So. 2d 750, 753 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (“Negligence is the most common 
basis for tort liability.”); Gregory M. Dexter, Tort Liability for Golf Shots: Time to Reject the Reck-
lessness Standard and Respect the Rules of Golf, 9 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 41 
(2012) (“[N]egligence is the most common standard for assessing liability in modern tort law . . . .”); 
F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1819 (2014) (“Negligence is the most common form of ‘fault’ in tort law and is 
often defined by reference to a ‘reasonable person,’ whose conduct is, by definition, never negli-
gent.”); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Marie Bradshaw Durrant, State and Regional Control of Geological 
Carbon Sequestration (Part I), 41 ENV’T L. REP. 10348, 10373 (2011) (“Negligence is the most 
common cause of action in the tort system.”); Eliot T. Tracz, Half Truths, Empty Promises, and Hot 
Coffee: The Economics of Tort Reform, 42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 311, 314 (2018) (“Negligence is the 
most common tort claim . . . .”). 
 342 See Jason M. Solomon, Juries, Social Norms, and Civil Justice, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1142–
71 (2014) (analyzing the history of American tort law and arguing how a jury-centered approach to 
interpreting reasonableness has not been inevitable). 
 343 See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 135, at 608. There are exceptions, of course, such as Holmes’ 
much-maligned railroad crossing rule in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Goodman. 275 U.S. 66 (1927). 
 344 Kelley & Wendt, supra note 135, at 608.  
 345 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
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holds itself to the deferential standard of “clear error.”346 Even in cases where a 
plaintiff has violated a statute and jurors are instructed to follow the doctrine of 
negligence per se, courts nevertheless allow juries to disregard the instruction 
if they conclude that the violation is excusable after assessing that the defendant 
made a “reasonable” effort to comply or made a “reasonable” mistake regarding 
its applicability.347 At so many junctures, the jurors maintain control of the 
breach determination perhaps because, well, they can’t pass it to anyone else! 
It is difficult to explain away legislative and judicial delegation of the 
RPPT to jurors as mere laziness or desk clearing. It is not obvious that having 
juries handle the determination spares judges any labor at all—it probably does 
the opposite by making jury trials more likely to occur. And it is hard to be-
lieve that judges are hoping to shift public blame to jurors, particularly when it 
is conceivable that jurors would still assess damages348 and, therefore, bear 
much of the risk of public condemnation anyway. 
If the only legislative goal were to maximize the likelihood that case out-
comes under the RPPT correspond to the legislators’ preferred state of affairs, 
then the hot potato strategy would make little sense. Jurors are accorded too 
much deference and freedom for that to be the case. Something nobler must be 
going on. 
B. Solving the Puzzle with Structural Values 
Several scholars have claimed that the prominent role that jurors play in 
tort law is an effort to promote the value of participatory democracy.349 Partic-
ipatory democracy is the notion that democracies require direct, individual par-
ticipation by citizens in governmental decisions and policies that affect their 
lives.350 
                                                                                                                           
 346 See, e.g., Furry v. United States, 712 F.3d 988, 992 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Ordinarily, breach . . . 
[is] reviewed for clear error.”). 
 347 See John C.P. Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 484–85 (2015). 
 348 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Arrington, 101 S.E. 415, 423 (Va. 1919), abrogated by 
John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 650 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 2007) (“The law wisely leaves the assessment of dam-
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ing . . . .”). 
 349 See, e.g., ALBERT W. DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, & THE JURY 14 
(2012); Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. 
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to Political Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 49 KAN. L. REV. 65, 98 (2000); Alexandra D. Lahav, 
The Jury and Participatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. (CIV. JURY AS POL. INST. SYMP.) 
1029, 1031–32 (2014); William E. Nelson, Political Decision Making by Informed Juries, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. (CIV. JURY AS POL. INST. SYMP.) 1149, 1150–51 (2014).  
 350 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1187–90 (1991). 
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Akhil Amar argues that the idea was highly salient during the period of 
our Constitution’s ratification, with prominent legal thinkers characterizing the 
role of the jury as an opportunity for the people to have a share of control in 
the judiciary; they perceived it as a better opportunity for direct representation 
than the legislature.351 
In recent history, courts have periodically echoed the sentiment that jurors 
serve this function. In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court stated that 
broadly representative community participation in criminal juries is “not only 
consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence 
in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”352 
Although an interest in participatory democracy might explain why the 
jury is given the task of determining breach, it does not necessarily explain 
why the jury is given so little guidance in how to do it. Why not narrow the 
parameters? 
One attractive possibility is that the openness of the RPPT maximizes the 
feeling in jurors that they are doing more than simply following a set of in-
structions. On this account, the minimal guidance of the RPPT turns out to be a 
strength. It allows jurors to be quasi-legislators within the limits set by the of-
ficial legislature. So, although insofar as a jury is not allowed to usurp the leg-
islature,353 the RPPT gives them ample room to place their own personal stamp 
on the way the law is applied in a particular case. 
But this solution opens another challenge: if this is about granting jurors 
an opportunity to influence the content of the law, then why narrow their delib-
eration through a norm at all? In other words, why have the RPPT rather than 
an even more open-ended norm, such as: “Assess whether the defendant 
should be liable”? 
The best explanation, in my opinion, is that the modest constraining power 
of the RPPT addresses an additional value—namely, deliberative democracy. 
                                                                                                                           
 351 Id. at 1140. 
 352 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 
1093 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“The jury is a sort of ad hoc parliament convened from 
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 353 See, e.g., People v. Douglas, 680 N.Y.S.2d 145, 153 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (“The jury system is an 
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Deliberative democracy is the demand that citizens appeal to principals 
when they participate in politics.354 That is, citizens must provide reasons for 
their political decisions that would not be rejected by other individuals who 
demand fair terms of cooperation when they take part in the governance of that 
same society.355 The primary appeal of policy driven by the dictates of deliber-
ative democracy is that it drives citizens, “to hear otherwise powerless or op-
pressed groups and, insofar as their arguments are reasonable, to grant them 
influence.”356 It further has the capacity to create something like a regulated 
marketplace of ideas: allowing the better argument to prevail in a context un-
constrained by authoritative directives other than the baseline directive that 
discussants provide reasons that meet the aforementioned condition.357 Thus, it 
aspires to legitimize democratic rule while providing ground for sound deci-
sion-making.358 
The RPPT provides just enough structure for juries to meet the demands 
of deliberative democracy. The content of the RPPT is open-ended enough to 
keep them from being constrained by authoritative directives beyond the bare 
necessities, but it provides enough of a nudge to get them into a reasoned 
mindset. This function is plausible. In earlier work,359 I described the idea that 
legal standards could serve as “moral reminders,” a phenomenon identified by 
Nina Mazar, On Amir, and Dan Ariely in their landmark article, The Dishones-
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ty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance.360 There, the au-
thors performed a series of experiments providing support for the notion that 
bringing items that have moral connotations, like the Ten Commandments, into 
attention can lower the probability of misconduct on subsequent, seemingly 
unrelated tasks.361 The RPPT could, like other standards, serve as a moral re-
minder. Interpretation of the content of the RPPT might trigger a juror’s “better 
angels,” reminding them to focus upon the higher values that pertain to a case 
and potentially leading them to transcend their personal preferences regarding 
the outcome of the case. 
To be sure, the RPPT does not direct jurors to do precisely what delibera-
tive democracy demands. It does not tell them even to “act reasonably.” But 
this is potentially a good thing, more consistent with the ethos of deliberative 
democracy.362 Instead, the RPPT asks jurors to consider what “a reasonably 
prudent person would do;” it suggests stepping outside of the parameters of 
one’s own identity, and it does so with a subtlety that could serve to maintain 
the autonomy of the juror. In the moral reminders experiment, subjects were 
not told that they must follow the dictates of the Ten Commandments, they 
were simply asked to list all that they could remember, and the effect was the 
same regardless of the apparent religiosity of the subject.363 The RPPT is writ-
ten such that jurors need to think in terms of some standard—some sort of way 
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to use real reasons to justify their position. This could increase the likelihood 
that they will engage in reasoned discussion rather than deciding⸺on the one 
hand, by bare, self-interested fiat or⸺on the other hand, from mechanical 
compliance with authoritative directives. 
Importantly, a moral reminder function for the RPPT differs from a Moral 
Conception of the RPPT. The former operates to increase the rigor and sensi-
tivity with which one interprets the RPPT; whereas the latter claims to be the 
one true interpretation of the RPPT and, thus, a legal command. A moral re-
minder gives an account of how the broad moralistic language of the RPPT 
could place a juror in the mindset that they must internally (or, among other 
jurors, in deliberation with them) articulate reasons along some sort of norma-
tive ground. It is not coercive or directed thinking in the way that a rule would 
be; therefore, it preserves autonomy, at least in principle. Thus, the RPPT’s 
role does not turn on a particular understanding of the RPPT’s meaning; it 
could very well lead a juror to adopt a mechanical approach to breach, such as 
the Average Conduct Conception. 
I am not the first to link juries to deliberative democracy. Jeffrey Abram-
son, in his impactful 1994 book, We, the Jury, put forth the notion, stating, 
“Surely the jury has not survived all these centuries only to teach us that de-
mocracy is about brokering justice among irreconcilably antagonistic groups. I 
will argue for an alternative view of the jury, a vision that defends the jury as a 
deliberative rather than a representative body.”364 
It is fair to question whether the intention behind the development of the 
RPPT, insofar as there was one at all, was to effectuate the two values of par-
ticipatory and deliberative democracy. I suspect not. Were the goal to get jurors 
to offer reasoned, principled bases for their decisions, there are more direct 
methods than using the RPPT. American courts could follow the example of 
the continental mixed courts365 and require that jurors individually or collec-
tively offer explanations for their decisions. The bare fact that structural di-
mensions of the RPPT might be explained by democratic values does not mean 
that, as a historical matter, it was why the RPPT took on the shape it now has. 
But this is beside the point: what matters is whether the RPPT actually per-
forms this function and not whether it was designed to perform it. 
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There is reason to believe that it does. Feigenson observed in his field 
study that juries seek “total justice,” in which they exhibit more concern for 
“making things come out right than with strictly following the relevant legal 
rules[,]” but their everyday habits of judgment and care usually yield results 
that are consistent with those of legal experts.366 Although the reality sounds 
messier than the ideal, this supports the notion that the spirit of these demo-
cratic values is often embodied in the deliberations of actual juries. They care 
about justice, but they form their own pathways towards it. As mentioned, mul-
tiple studies provide evidence that the sophistication of moral reasoning influ-
ences jury outcomes.367 
Not everyone agrees. Jason Solomon is skeptical that jury deliberation em-
bodies this ideal,368 citing evidence that juries suffer from uneven participation 
that favors already-advantaged groups, such as males and people with high oc-
cupational status.369 Solomon is also concerned with erratic punitive damages 
assessments from juries, linking those results to problems in deliberation.370 
The empirical literature regarding those awards, however, provides indi-
rect support for the position that jurors engage in principled deliberation under 
moral reminders. Punitive damages awards are a useful parallel to breach de-
terminations. They are governed by a standard that, like the RPPT, incorpo-
rates moralistic language such as, “[p]unitive damages may be awarded for 
conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reck-
less indifference to the rights of others.”371 The landmark book, Punitive Dam-
ages: How Juries Decide, praises juror conduct under the punitive damages 
standard: 
Throughout the present research, we have been impressed by the seri-
ous and energetic manner in which citizens performed the difficult le-
gal judgment tasks that are demanded by the punitive damages deci-
sion. The many systematic patterns of behavior that we observed are 
convincing evidence of the jurors’ conscientiousness. Nonetheless, the 
legally required decision tasks often seemed to exceed their individual 
and social capacities. The decision task is not well defined by the jury 
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instructions[, and] jurors are not provided with the necessary back-
ground information or experiences to make reliable judgments . . . .372 
This finally brings us to an unavoidable cost of any approach to the automation 
of the RPPT: the value of the RPPT as a pathway for participatory and deliber-
ative democracy, such as it is, would disappear if machines were to take on the 
role of deciding breach. There is no way to automate a function completely 
without taking human beings out of that function, regardless of the advance-
ment of the technology. 
Without knowing the particular interests of those who might consider au-
tomation, it is nevertheless important to understand the different ways that 
technology will enhance or diminish public values. There are no guarantees that 
a legislator would care about the RPPT’s role in bringing about participatory or 
deliberative democracy. But for the legislator who does care about those values, 
automation of the RPPT eliminates one avenue for their realization.373 
CONCLUSION 
I am here neither to praise automation, nor to condemn it. Instead, I have 
taken a humbler role: I have attempted to map the vectors of cost and benefit if 
legislators someday seek to computerize a difficult but significant area of law. 
In doing so, I have flagged that legally plausible interpretations of marginal 
significance in tort law might, for a time, become more attractive because they 
are friendly to computerization. I have also provided reasons to doubt that cer-
tain interpretations will serve as the basis for automation. Lastly, I have tried to 
show that, although the Reasonably Prudent Person Test’s interpretive mallea-
bility plays a crucial role in setting the cost of legal automation, there are struc-
tural aspects of negligence law beyond the text of the test that matter.  Specifi-
cally, removing jurors from the determination of breach could extinguish cele-
brated opportunities for participatory and deliberative democracy.  The value 
of those opportunities may be doubted, but we cannot question their essence: 
they are unavoidably human. 
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